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Chapter 1
Introduction
We present here various results, which may one day be published in a bigger paper, and which we
wish to make already available to the community.
We investigate several technical and conceptual questions.
Our main subject is the investigation of independence as a ternary relation in the context of non-
monotonic logic. In the context of probability, this investigation was started by W. Spohn et al.,
and then followed by J. Pearl. We look at products of function sets, and thus continue our own
investigation of independence in non-monotonic logic. We show that a finite characterization of
this relation in our context is impossible, and indicate how to construct all valid rules.
7
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Chapter 2
Countably many disjoint sets
We show here that - independent of the cardinality of the language - one can define only countably
many inconsistent formulas.
The question is due to D. Makinson (personal communication).
We show here that, independent of the cardinality of the language, one can define only countably
many inconsistent formulas.
The problem is due to D. Makinson (personal communication).
Example 2.0.1
There is a countably infinite set of formulas s.t. the defined model sets are pairwise disjoint.
Let pi : i ∈ ω be propositional variables.
Consider φi :=
∧
{¬pj : j < i} ∧ pi for i ∈ ω.
Obviously, M(φi) 6= ∅ for all i.
Let i < i′; we show M(φi) ∩M(φi′) = ∅. M(φi′) |= ¬pi, M(φi) |= pi.
✷
Fact 2.0.1
Any set X of consistent formulas with pairwise disjoint model sets is at most countable
Proof
Let such X be given.
(1) We may assume that X consists of conjunctions of propositional variables or their negations.
Proof: Rewrite all φ ∈ X as disjunctions of conjunctions φj . At least one of the conjunctions φj is
consistent. Replace φ by one such φj . Consistency is preserved, as is pairwise disjointness.
9
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(2) Let X be such a set of formulas. Let Xi ⊆ X be the set of formulas in X with length i, i.e., a
consistent conjunction of i many propositional variables or their negations, i > 0.
As the model sets for X are pairwise disjoint, the model sets for all φ ∈ Xi have to be disjoint.
(3) It suffices now to show that each Xi is at most countable; we even show that each Xi is finite.
Proof by induction:
Consider i = 1. Let φ, φ′ ∈ X1. Let φ be p or ¬p. If φ′ is not ¬φ, then φ and φ′ have a common
model. So one must be p, the other ¬p. But these are all possibilities, so card(X1) is finite.
Let the result be shown for k < i.
Consider now Xi. Take arbitrary φ ∈ Xi. Without loss of generality, let φ = p1 ∧ . . . ∧ pi. Take
arbitrary φ′ 6= φ. AsM(φ)∩M(φ′) = ∅, φ′ must be a conjunction containing one of ¬pk, 1 ≤ k ≤ i.
Consider now Xi,k := {φ′ ∈ Xi : φ′ contains ¬pk}. Thus Xi = {φ} ∪
⋃
{Xi,k : 1 ≤ k ≤ i}. Note
that all ψ, ψ′ ∈ Xi,k agree on ¬pk, so the situation in Xi,k is isomorphic to Xi−1. So, by induction
hypothesis, card(Xi,k) is finite, as all φ
′ ∈ Xi,k have to be mutually inconsistent. Thus, card(Xi)
is finite. (Note that we did not use the fact that elements from different Xi,k, Xi,k′ also have to
be mutually inconsistent; our rough proof suffices.)
✷
Note that the proof depends very little on logic. We needed normal forms, and used two truth
values. Obviously, we can easily generalize to finitely many truth values.
Chapter 3
Independence as ternary relation
3.1 Introduction
3.1.1 Independence
Independence is a central concept of reasoning.
In the context of non-monotonic logic and related areas like theory revision, it was perhaps first
investigated formally by R. Parikh and co-authors, see e.g. [Par96], to obtain “local” conflict
solution.
The present authors investigated its role for interpolation in preferential logics in [GS10], and
showed connections to abstract multiplication of size.
Independence plays also a central role for a FOL treatment of preferential logics, where problems
like the “dark haired Swedes” have to be treated. This is still subject of ongoing research.
J. Pearl investigated independence in graphs and pobabilistic reasoning, e.g. in [Pea88], also as a
ternary relation, 〈X | Y | Z〉.
The aim of the present paper is to extend this abstract approach to the preferential situation. We
should emphasize that this is only an abstract description of the independence relation, and thus
not the same as independence for non-monotonic interpolation as examined in [GS10], where we
used independence, essentially in the form of the multiplicative law µ(X × Y ) = µ(X) × µ(Y ),
which says that the µ−function preserves independence.
We have not investigated if an interesting form of interpolation results from some application of µ
to situations described by 〈X | Y | Z〉, analogously to above application of µ to situations described
by 〈X || Y 〉.
11
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3.1.2 Overview
We will first discuss simple examples, to introduce the main ideas.
We then present the basic definitions formally, for probabilistic and set independence.
We then show basic results for set independence as a ternary relation, and turn to our main results,
absence of finite characterization, and construction of new rules for this ternary relation.
3.1.3 Discussion of some simple examples
We consider here X = Y = Z = W = {0, 1} and their products. We will later generalize, but the
main ideas stay the same. First, we look at X × Z (the Cartesian product of X with Z), then at
X ×Z ×W, at X × Y × Z, finally at X × Y ×Z ×W. Elements of these products, i.e., sequences,
will be written for simplicity 00, 01, 10, etc., context will disambiguate. General sequences will
often be written σ, τ, etc. We will also look at subsets of these products, like {00, 11} ⊆ X × Z,
and various probability measures on these products.
As a matter of fact, the main part of this article concerns subsets A of products X1× . . .×Xn and
a suitable notion of independence for A, roughly, if we can write A as A1 × . . .×Am. This will be
made more precise and discussed in progressively more complicated cases in this section.
In the context of preferential structures, A is intended to be µ(X1 × . . .×Xn), the set of minimal
models of X1 × . . .×Xn.
3.1.3.1 X × Z
Let P : X × Z → [0, 1] be a (fixed) probability measure.
If A ⊆ X × Z, we will set P (A) := Σ{P (σ) : σ ∈ A}.
If Ax := {σ ∈ X × Z : σ(X) = x}, we will write P (x) for P (Ax), likewise P (z) for P (Az),
if Az := {σ ∈ X × Z : σ(Z) = z}. When these are ambiguous, we will e.g. write AX=0 for
{σ ∈ X × Z : σ(X) = 0}, and P (X = 0) for P (AX=0), etc.
We say that X and Z are independent for this P iff for all xz ∈ X × Z P (xz) = P (x) ∗ P (z).
We write then 〈X || Z〉P , and call this and its variants probabilistic independence.
Example 3.1.1
(1)
P (00) = P (01) = 1/6, P (10) = P (11) = 1/3.
Then P (X = 0) = 1/6 + 1/6 = 1/3, and P (X = 1) = 2/3, P (Z = 0) = 1/6 + 1/3 = 1/2, and
P (Z = 1) = 1/2, so 〈X || Z〉P .
(2)
P (00) = P (11) = 1/3, P (01) = P (10) = 1/6.
Then P (X = 0) = P (X = 1) = P (Z = 0) = P (Z = 1) = 1/2, but P (00) = 1/3 6= 1/2 ∗ 1/2 = 1/4,
so ¬〈X || Z〉P .
Definition 3.1.1
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Consider now ∅ 6= A ⊆ X × Z for general X,Z.
Define the following probability measure on X × Z :
PA(σ) :=


1
card(A) iff σ ∈ A
0 iff σ 6∈ A
Example 3.1.2
(1)
A := {00, 01},
then PA(00) = PA(01) = 1/2, PA(10) = PA(11) = 0, PA(X = 0) = 1, PA(X = 1) = 0, PA(Z =
0) = PA(Z = 1) = 1/2, and we have 〈X || Z〉PA .
(2)
A := {00, 11},
then PA(00) = PA(11) = 1/2, PA(01) = PA(10) = 0, PA(X = 0) = PA(X = 1) = 1/2, PA(Z =
0) = PA(Z = 1) = 1/2, but PA(00) = 1/2 6= PA(X = 0) ∗ PA(Z = 0) = 1/4, and we have
¬〈X || Z〉PA .
(3)
A := {00, 01, 11},
then PA(00) = PA(01) = PA(11) = 1/3, PA(10) = 0, PA(X = 0) = 2/3, PA(X = 1) = 1/3,
PA(Z = 0) = 1/3, PA(Z = 1) = 2/3, but PA(00) = 1/3 6= PA(X = 0) ∗ PA(Z = 0) = 2/3 ∗ 1/3 =
2/9, and we have ¬〈X || Z〉PA .
Note that in (1) above, A = {0} × {0, 1}, but neither in (2), nor in (3), A can be written as such
a product. This is no coincidence, as we will see now.
More formally, we write 〈X || Z〉A iff for all στ ∈ A there is ρ ∈ A such that ρ(X) = σ(X) and
ρ(Z) = τ(Z), or, equivalently, that A = {σ(X) : σ ∈ A} × {σ(Z) : σ ∈ A}, meaning that we can
combine fragments of functions in A arbitrarily.
We call this and its variants set independence.
Fact 3.1.1
Consider above situation X × Z. Then 〈X || Z〉PA iff 〈X || Z〉A.
Proof
“⇒”:
A ⊆ {σ(X) : σ ∈ A} × {σ(Z) : σ ∈ A} is trivial. Suppose PA(x, z) = PA(x) ∗ PA(z), but there are
σ, τ ∈ A, σ(X)τ(Z) 6∈ A. Then PA(x), PA(z) > 0, but PA(x, z) = 0, a contradiction.
“⇐”:
Case 1: PA(x) = 0, then PA(x, z) = 0, and we are done. Likewise for PA(Z) = 0.
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Case 2: PA(x), PA(z) > 0.
By definition and prerequisite,
PA(x) =
card{σ∈A:σ(X)=x}
card(A) =
card{σ(Z):σ∈A}
card(A) ,
PA(z) =
card{σ∈A:σ(Z)=z}
card(A) =
card{σ(X):σ∈A}
card(A) ,
PA(x, z) =
card{σ∈A:σ(X)=x,σ(Z)=z}
card(A) =
1
card(A) .
By prerequisite again, card(A) = card{σ(X) : σ ∈ A} = card{σ(Z) : σ ∈ A}, so card{σ(Z):σ∈A}
card(A) ∗
card{σ(X):σ∈A}
card(A) =
1
card(A)
✷
3.1.3.2 X × Z ×W
Here, W will not be mentioned directly.
Let P : X × Z ×W → [0, 1] be a probability measure.
Again, we say that X and Z are independent for P, 〈X || Z〉P , iff for all x ∈ X, z ∈ Z P (x, z) =
P (x) ∗ P (z).
Example 3.1.3
(1)
Let P (000) = P (001) = P (010) = P (011) = 1/12, P (100) = P (101) = P (110) = P (111) = 1/6,
then X and Z are independent.
(2)
Let P (100) = P (101) = P (010) = P (011) = 1/12, P (000) = P (001) = P (110) = P (111) = 1/6,
then P (X = 0) = P (X = 1) = P (Z = 0) = P (Z = 1) = 1/2, but P (X = 0, Z = 0) = 1/3 6=
1/2 ∗ 1/2 = 1/4, so ¬〈X || Z〉P .
As above, we define PA for ∅ 6= A ⊆ X × Z ×W.
Example 3.1.4
(1)
A := {000, 001, 010, 011}. Then PA(X = 0, Z = 0) = PA(X = 0, Z = 1) = 1/2, PA(X = 1, Z =
0) = PA(X = 1, Z = 1) = 0, PA(X = 0) = 1, PA(X = 1) = 0, PA(Z = 0) = PA(Z = 1) = 1/2, so
X and Z are independent.
(2)
For A := {000, 001, 110, 111}, we see that X and Z are not independent for PA.
Considering possible decompositions of A into set products, we are not so much interested how
many continuations into W we have, but if there are any or none. This is often the case in logic,
we are not interested how many models there are, but if there is a model at all.
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Thus we define independence for A again by:
〈X || Z〉A iff for all στ ∈ A there is ρ ∈ A such that ρ(X) = σ(X) and ρ(Z) = τ(Z).
The equivalence between probabilitistic independence, 〈X || Z〉PA and set independence, 〈X || Z〉A
is lost now, as the second part of the following example shows:
Example 3.1.5
(1)
A := {000, 010, 100, 110} satisfies both forms of independence, 〈X || Z〉PA and set independence,
〈X || Z〉A.
(2)
A := {000, 001, 010, 100, 110}.
Here, we have PA(X = 0) = 3/5, PA(X = 1) = 2/5, PA(Z = 0) = 3/5, PA(Z = 1) = 2/5, but
PA(X = 0, Z = 0) = 2/5 6= 3/5 ∗ 3/5.
Consider now 〈X || Z〉A : Take σ, τ ∈ A, then for all possible values σ(X), τ(Z), there is ρ such
that ρ(X) = σ(X), ρ(Z) = τ(Z) - the value ρ(W ) is without importance.
We have, however:
Fact 3.1.2
〈X || Z〉PA ⇒ 〈X || Z〉A.
Proof
Let σ, τ ∈ A, but suppose there is no ρ ∈ A such that ρ(X) = σ(X) and ρ(Z) = τ(Z). Then
PA(σ(X)), PA(τ(Z)) > 0, but PA(σ(X), τ(Z)) = 0. ✷
3.1.3.3 X × Y × Z
We consider now independence of X and Z, given Y.
The probabilistic definition is:
〈X | Y | Z〉P iff for all x ∈ X, y ∈ Y, z ∈ Z P (x, y, z) ∗ P (y) = P (x, y) ∗ P (y, z).
As we are interested mainly in subsets A ⊆ X × Y × Z and the resulting PA, and combination of
function fragments, we work immediately with these.
We have to define 〈X | Y | Z〉A.
〈X | Y | Z〉A iff for all σ, τ ∈ A such that σ(Y ) = τ(Y ) there is ρ ∈ A such that ρ(X) = σ(X),
ρ(Y ) = σ(Y ) = τ(Y ), ρ(Z) = τ(Z).
When we set for y ∈ Y Ay := {σ ∈ A : σ(Y ) = y}, we then have:
Ay = {σ(X) : σ ∈ Ay} × {y} × {σ(Z) : σ ∈ Ay}.
The following example shows that 〈X | Y | Z〉A and 〈X || Z〉A are independent from each other:
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Example 3.1.6
(1)
〈X | Y | Z〉A may hold, but not 〈X || Z〉A :
Consider A := {000, 111}. 〈X | Y | Z〉A is obvious, as only σ goes through each element in the
middle. But there is no 0x1, so 〈X || Z〉A fails.
(2)
〈X || Z〉A may hold, but not 〈X | Y | Z〉A :
Consider A := {000, 101, 110, 011}. Fixing, e.g., 0 in the middle shows that 〈X | Y | Z〉A fails, but
neglecting the middle, we can combine arbitrarily, so 〈X || Z〉A holds.
Example 3.1.7
This example show that 〈X | Y | Z〉A does not mean that A is some product AX ×AY ×AZ :
Let A := {000, 111}, then clearly 〈X | Y | Z〉A, but A is no such product.
We have again:
Fact 3.1.3
Let ∅ 6= A ⊆ X × Y × Z, then 〈X | Y | Z〉A and 〈X | Y | Z〉PA are equivalent.
Proof
“⇐”:
Suppose there are σ, τ ∈ A such that σ(Y ) = τ(Y ), but there is no ρ ∈ A such that ρ(X) = σ(X),
ρ(Y ) = σ(Y ) = τ(Y ), ρ(Z) = τ(Z). Then PA(σ(X), σ(Y )), PA(τ(Y ), τ(Z)), PA(σ(Y )) > 0, but
PA(σ(X), σ(Y ) = τ(Y ), τ(Z)) = 0.
“⇒”:
Case 1: PA(x, y) or PA(y, z) = 0, then PA(x, y, z) = 0, and we are done.
Case 2: PA(x, y), PA(y, z) > 0. By definition and prerequisite, PA(x, y) =
card{σ∈A:σ(X)=x,σ(Y )=y}
card(A)
= card{σ(Z):σ∈A,σ(Y )=y}
card(A) and PA(y, z) =
card{σ∈A:σ(Y )=y,σ(Z)=Z}
card(A) =
card{σ(X):σ∈A,σ(Y )=y}
card(A) , so
PA(x, y)∗PA(y, z) =
card{σ∈A:σ(Y )=y}
card(A)∗card(A) . Moreover, PA(y) =
card{σ∈A:σ(Y )=y}
card(A) , PA(x, y, z) =
1
card(A) ,
so PA(y) ∗ PA(x, y, z) =
card{σ∈A:σ(Y )=y}
card(A)∗card(A) = PA(x, y) ∗ PA(y, z)
✷
3.1.3.4 X × Y × Z ×W
The definitions stay the same as for X × Y × Z.
The equivalence between probabilitistic independence, 〈X | Y | Z〉PA and set independence, 〈X |
Y | Z〉A is lost again, as the following example shows:
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Example 3.1.8
A := {0000, 0001, 0010, 1000, 1010}.
Here, we have PA(X = 0, Y = 0) = 3/5, PA(X = 1, Y = 0) = 2/5, PA(Y = 0, Z = 0) = 3/5,
PA(Y = 0, Z = 1) = 2/5, PA(Y = 0) = 1, but PA(X = 0, Y = 0, Z = 0) = 2/5 6= 3/5 ∗ 3/5.
Consider now 〈X | Y | Z〉A : Take σ, τ ∈ A, such that σ(Y ) = τ(Y ), then for all possible values
σ(X), τ(Z), there is ρ such that ρ(X) = σ(X), ρ(Y ) = σ(Y ) = τ(Y ), ρ(Z) = τ(Z) - the value
ρ(W ) is without importance.
We have, however:
Fact 3.1.4
〈X | Y | Z〉PA ⇒ 〈X | Y | Z〉A.
Proof
Let σ, τ ∈ A such that σ(Y ) = τ(Y ), but suppose there is no ρ ∈ A such that ρ(X) =
σ(X), ρ(Y ) = σ(Y ) = τ(Y ), ρ(Z) = τ(Z). Then PA(σ(X), σ(Y )), PA(σ(Y ), τ(Z)) > 0, but
PA(σ(X), σ(Y ), τ(Z)) = 0. ✷
3.1.3.5 A remark on generalization
The X,Y, Z,W may also be more complicated sets, themselves products, but this will not change
definitions and results beyond notation.
In the more complicated cases, we will often denote subsets by more complicated letters than A,
e.g., by Σ.
3.1.3.6 A remark on intuition
Consider set independence, where A := µ(U), U = U1 × . . .× Un. Set 〈. . .〉 := 〈. . .〉µ(U).
(1) 〈X || Z〉 means then:
(1.1) all we know is that we are in a normal situation,
(1.2) if we know in addition something definite about Z (1 model!) we do not know anything
more about X, and vice versa.
〈X | Y | Z〉 means then:
(1.1) all we know is that we are in a normal situation,
(1.2) if we have definite information about Y, we may know more about X. But knowing
something in addition about Z will not give us not more information about X, and
conversely.
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(2) The restriction to µ(U) codes our background knowledge.
(3) Note that X ∪ Y ∪ Z need not be I, e.g., W might be missing. We did not count the
continuations into W, but considered only existence of a continuation (if this does not exist,
then there just is no such sequence).
This corrsponds to multiplication with 1, the unit ALL on W, or, more generally, in the rest
of the paper, with 1I−(X∪Y∪Z). We may choose however we want, it has to be somewhere,
in ALL.
3.1.4 Basic definitions
Definition 3.1.2
If f is a function, Y a subset of its domain, we write f ↾ Y for the restriction of f to elements of
Y.
If F is a set of functions over Y, then F ↾ Y := {f ↾ Y : f ∈ F}.
3.2 Probabilistic and set independence
3.2.1 Probabilistic independence
Independence as an abstract ternary relation for probability and other situations has been examined
by W. Spohn, see [Spo80], A. P. Dawid, see [Daw79], J. Pearl, see, e.g., [Pea88], etc.
Definition 3.2.1
(1)
Let I 6= ∅ be an arbitrary (index) set, for i ∈ I Ui 6= ∅ arbitrary sets. Let U := Π{Ui : i ∈ I}, and
for X ⊆ I UX := Π{Ui : i ∈ X}.
(2)
Let P : P(U) → [0, 1] be a probability measure. (We may assume that P is defined by its value
on singletons.)
(3.1)
By abuse of language, for X ⊆ I, x ∈ UX , let P (x) := P ({u ∈ U : ∀i ∈ Xu(i) = x(i)}), so
P (x) = P ({u ∈ U : u ↾ X = x}).
Analogously, for X,Y ⊆ I, X ∩ Y = ∅, x ∈ UX , y ∈ UY , let P (x, y) := P ({u ∈ U : u ↾ X = x and
u ↾ Y = y}).
(3.2)
Finally, for X,Y, Z ⊆ I pairwise disjoint, x ∈ UX , y ∈ UY , z ∈ UZ , let P (x | y) :=
P (x,y)
P (y) ,
P (x | y, z) := P (x,y,z)
P (y,z) , etc.
(We have, of course, to pay attention that we do not divide by 0.)
Definition 3.2.2
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P as above defines a 3-place relation of independence on pairwise disjoint X,Y, Z ⊆ I 〈X | Y | Z〉P
by
〈X | Y | Z〉P :↔


∀x ∈ UX , ∀y ∈ UY , ∀z ∈ UZ(P (y, z) > 0→ P (x | y) = P (x | y, z)), if Y 6= ∅
i.e., P (x, y)/P (y) = P (x, y, z)/P (y, z), or
P (x, y, z) ∗ P (y) = P (x, y) ∗ P (y, z)
∀x ∈ UX , ∀z ∈ UZ(P (z) > 0→ P (x) = P (x | z)), if Y = ∅
i.e., P (x) = P (x, z)/P (z), or
P (x, z) = P (x) ∗ P (z)
If Y = ∅, we shall also write 〈X || Z〉P for 〈X | Y | Z〉P .
Recall from Section 3.1.3 (page 12) that we call this notion probabilistic independence.
E.g., Pearl discusses the rules (a) − (e) of Definition 3.2.3 (page 19) for the relation defined in
Definition 3.2.2 (page 18).
Definition 3.2.3
(a) Symmetry: 〈X | Y | Z〉 ↔ 〈Z | Y | X〉
(b) Decomposition: 〈X | Y | Z ∪W 〉 → 〈X | Y | Z〉
(c) Weak Union: 〈X | Y | Z ∪W 〉 → 〈X | Y ∪W | Z〉
(d) Contraction: 〈X | Y | Z〉 and 〈X | Y ∪ Z |W 〉 → 〈X | Y | Z ∪W 〉
(e) Intersection: 〈X | Y ∪W | Z〉 and 〈X | Y ∪ Z |W 〉 → 〈X | Y | Z ∪W 〉
(∅) Empty outside: 〈X | Y | Z〉 if X = ∅ or Z = ∅.
Proposition 3.2.1
If P is a probability measure, and 〈X | Y | Z〉P defined as above, then (a)− (d) of Definition 3.2.3
(page 19) hold for 〈. . .〉 = 〈. . .〉P , and if P is strictly positive, (e) will also hold.
The proof is elementary, well known, and will not be repeated here.
Doch ein Beispiel geben?
3.2.1.1 A side remark on preferential structures
Being a minimal element is not upward absolute in general preferential structures, but in raked
structures, provided the smaller set contains some element minimal in the bigger set.
Fact 3.2.2
In the probabilistic interpretation, the following holds:
Let U be a finite set, f : U → ℜ such that ∀u ∈ U.f(u) ≥ 0.
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For all A ⊆ U, such that ∃a′ ∈ A.f(a′) > 0 and all a ∈ A
fA(a) :=
f(a)
Σ{f(a′):a′∈A} defines a probability measure on A.
For B ⊆ A, define fA(B) := Σ{fA(b) : b ∈ B}. Then the following property holds:
(BASIC) For all D ⊆ B ⊆ A ⊆ U such that ∃b ∈ B.f(b) > 0 fA(D) = fA(B) ∗ fB(D).
Proof
For X ⊆ Y ⊆ U such that ∃y ∈ Y.f(y) > 0 we have fY (X) := Σ{fY (x) : x ∈ X} =
Σ{f(x):x∈X}
Σ{f(y):y∈Y } .
Thus, fA(D) :=
Σ{f(d):d∈D}
Σ{f(a):a∈A} =
Σ{f(b):b∈B}
Σ{f(a):a∈A} ∗
Σ{f(d):d∈D}
Σ{f(b):b∈B} = fA(B) ∗ fB(D).
✷
We have the following fact for µ generated by a relation:
Fact 3.2.3
Let U be a finite preferential structure such that for A ⊆ U µ(A) = ∅ ⇒ A = ∅.
Then U is ranked iff (BASIC) as defined in Fact 3.2.2 (page 19) holds for fA.
Proof
“⇒”:
Let D ⊆ B ⊆ A ⊆ U, B 6= ∅.
Case 1: D ∩ µ(A) = ∅. Then fA(D) = 0.
Case 1.1: If B ∩ µ(A) = ∅, then fA(B) = 0, and we are done.
Case 1.2: Let B ∩ µ(A) 6= ∅. If D ∩ µ(B) = ∅, then fB(D) = 0, and we are done. Suppose
D ∩ µ(B) 6= ∅, so there is d ∈ D ∩ µ(B), so d ∈ D ∩ µ(A) by B ∩ µ(A) 6= ∅ and rankedness, so
fA(D) 6= ∅, contradiction.
Case 2: D ∩ µ(A) 6= ∅.
Thus, by D ⊆ B, B ∩ µ(A) 6= ∅, and by rankedness µ(B) = B ∩ µ(A). So by D ⊆ B again, D ∩
µ(A) = D ∩ (B ∩µ(A)) = D ∩ µ(B). By definition, fA(B) :=
card(µ(A)∩B)
card(µ(A)) , fA(D) :=
card(µ(A)∩D)
card(µ(A)) ,
fB(D) :=
card(µ(B)∩D)
card(µ(B)) . Thus,
card(µ(A)∩D)
card(µ(A)) =
card(µ(A)∩B)
card(µ(A)) ∗
card(µ(B)∩D)
card(µ(B)) .
“⇐”:
Then there are a, b, c ∈ U, where a is incomparable to b, and b ≺ c but a 6≺ c, or c ≺ b, but c 6≺ a.
We have four possible cases.
Let, in all cases, A := {a, b, c}. We construct a contradiction to (BASIC).
Case 1, b ≺ c :
Case 1.1, a is incomparable to c : Consider B := {a, c}, D := {a}. Then fA(D) =
1
2 , fA(B) =
1
2 ,
fB(D) =
1
2 .
Case 1.2, c ≺ a (so ≺ is not transitive): Consider B := {a, b}, D := {a}. Then fA(D) = 0,
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fA(B) = 1, fB(D) =
1
2 .
Case 2, c ≺ b :
Case 2.1, a is incomparable to c :
Consider B := {a, b}, D := {a}. Then fA(D) =
1
2 , fA(B) =
1
2 , fB(D) =
1
2 .
Case 2.2, a ≺ c - similar to Case 1.2.
✷
Remark 3.2.4
Note that sets A ⊆ B, where µ(B) ∩ A = ∅, and sets where P (A) = 0 have a similar, exceptional
role. This might still be important.
3.2.2 Set independence
We interpret independence here differently, but in a related way, as prepared in Section 3.1.3 (page
12).
Definition 3.2.4
We consider function sets Σ etc. over a fixed, arbitrary domain I 6= ∅, into some fixed codomain
K.
(1)
For pairwise disjoint subsets X,Y, Z of I, we define
〈X | Y | Z〉Σ iff for all f, g ∈ Σ such that f ↾ Y = g ↾ Y, there is h ∈ Σ such that h ↾ X = f ↾ X,
h ↾ Y = f ↾ Y = g ↾ Y, h ↾ Z = g ↾ Z.
Recall from Section 3.1.3 (page 12) that we call this notion set independence.
Y may be empty, then the condition f ↾ Y = g ↾ Y is void.
Note that nothing is said about I − (X ∪ Y ∪ Z), so we look at the projection of U to X ∪ Y ∪Z.
When Y = ∅, we will also write 〈X || Z〉Σ.
〈X | Y | Z〉Σ means thus, that we can piece functions together, or that we have a sort of de-
composition of Σ into a product. This is an independence property, we can put parts together
independently.
(2)
In the sequel, we will just write 〈. . .〉 for 〈. . .〉Σ when the meaning is clear from the context.
Recall that Example 3.1.5 (page 15) compares different forms of independence, the probabilistic
and the set variant.
Obviously, we can generalize the equivalence results for probabilistic and set independence for
X ×Z and X ×Y ×Z to the general situation with W in Section 3.1.3 (page 12), as long as we do
not consider the full functions σ, but only their restrictions to X,Y, Z, σ ↾ (X ∪Y ∪Z). As we will
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stop the discussion of probablistic independece here, and restrict ourselves to set independence,
this is left as an easy exercise to the reader.
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3.3 Basic results for set independence
Notation 3.3.1
In more complicated cases, we will often write ABC for 〈A | B | C〉, and ¬ABC or −ABC if
〈A | B | C〉 does not hold. Moreover, we will often just write f(A) for f ↾ A, etc.
For 〈A ∪ A′ | B | C〉, we will then write (AA′)BC, etc.
If only singletons are involved, we will sometimes write abc instead of ABC, etc.
When we speak about fragments of functions, we will often write just A : σ for σ ↾ A, B : σ = τ
for σ ↾ B = τ ↾ B, etc.
We use the following notations for functions:
Definition 3.3.1
The constant functions 0c and 1c :
0c(i) = 0 for all i ∈ I
1c(i) = 1 for all i ∈ I
Moreover, when we define a function σ : I → {0, 1} argument by argument, we abbreviate σ(a) = 0
by a = 0, etc.
Sometimes, we also give (a fragment of) a function just by the sequence of the values, so instead
of writing a = 0, b = 1, c = 1, we just write 011 - context will disambiguate.
Remark 3.3.1
This remark gives an intuitive justification of (some of) above rules in our context.
Rule (a) is trivial.
It is easiest to set Y := ∅ to see the intuitive meaning.
Rule (b) is a trivial consequence. If we can combine longer sequences, then we can combine shorter,
too.
Rule (c) is again a trivial consequence. If we can combine arbitrary sequences, then we can also
combine those which agree already on some part.
Rule (d) is the most interesting one, it says when we may combine longer sequences. Having just
〈X || Z〉 and 〈X || W 〉 as prerequisite does not suffice, as we might lose when applying 〈X || W 〉
what we had already by 〈X || Z〉. The condition 〈X | Z | W 〉 guarantees that we do not lose this.
In our context, it means the following:
We want to combine σ ↾ X with τ ↾ Z ∪W. By 〈X || Z〉, we can combine σ ↾ X with τ ↾ Z. Fix
ρ such that ρ ↾ X = σ ↾ X, ρ ↾ Z = τ ↾ Z. As ρ ↾ Z = τ ↾ Z, by 〈X | Z | W 〉, we can combine
ρ ↾ X ∪ Z with τ ↾ W, and have the result.
Note that we change the functions here, too: we start with σ, τ, then continue with ρ, τ.
We can use what we constructed already as a sort of scaffolding for constructing the rest.
Fact 3.3.2
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Zusammenhang 〈X | Y | Z〉 mit Produkten.
Proof
Do
✷
We show now that above Rules (a)− (d) hold in our context, but (e) does not hold.
Fact 3.3.3
In our interpretation,
(1) rule (e) does not hold,
(2) all 〈X | Y | ∅〉 (and thus also all 〈∅ | Y | Z〉) hold.
(3) rules (a)− (d) hold, even when one or both of the outside elements of the tripels is the empty
set.
Proof
(1) (e) does not hold:
Consider I := {x, y, z, w} and U := {1111, 0100}. Then x(yw)z and x(yz)w, as for all σ ↾ yw there
is just one τ this σ can be. The same holds for x(yz)w. But for y = 1, there are two different paths
through y = 1, which cannot be combined.
(2) This is a trivial consequence of the fact that {f : f : ∅ → U} = {∅}.
(3) Rules (a), (b), (c) are trivial, by definition, also for X,Z = ∅. In (c), if W = ∅, there is nothing
to show.
Rule (d): The cases for X,W,Z = ∅ are trivial. Assume σ, τ such that σ ↾ Y = τ ↾ Y, we
want to combine σ ↾ X with τ ↾ Z ∪W. By 〈X | Y | Z〉, there is ρ such that ρ ↾ X = σ ↾ X,
ρ ↾ Y = σ ↾ Y = τ ↾ Y, α ↾ X = ρ ↾ Z = τ ↾ Z. Thus ρ and τ satisfy the prerequisite of
〈X | Y ∪Z |W 〉, and there is α such that α ↾ X = ρ ↾ X = σ ↾ X, α ↾ X = ρ ↾ Y = σ ↾ Y = τ ↾ Y,
α ↾ W = τ ↾ W.
✷
Next, we give examples which shows that increasing the center set can change validity of the tripel
in any way.
Example 3.3.1
(1)
This example shows that neither 〈X | Y | Z〉 implies 〈X || Z〉, nor, conversely, 〈X || Z〉 implies
〈X | Y | Z〉.
Consider I := {x, y, z}.
Heiteres 25
(1.1) Let U := {〈0, 0, 0〉, 〈1, 1, 1〉, 〈0, 1, 0〉, 〈1, 0, 1〉, 〈1, 1, 0〉, 〈0, 0, 1〉}. Then 〈x || z〉, as all combina-
tions for x and y exist, i.e. paths with the projections 〈0, 0〉, 〈0, 1〉, 〈1, 0〉, 〈1, 1〉. Fix, e.g., y = 1.
Then the paths through y = 1 are 〈1, 1, 1〉, 〈0, 1, 0〉, 〈1, 1, 0〉, but 〈0, 1, 1〉 is missing. So 〈x | y | z〉
does not hold.
(1.2) Let U := {〈0, 0, 0〉, 〈1, 1, 1〉}. Then 〈x || z〉 trivially fails, but 〈x | y | z〉 holds.
(2)
Consider I := {x, a, b, c, d, z}.
Let Σ := {111111, 011110, 011101, 111100, 110111, 010000}.
Then ¬x(abcd)z, x(abc)z, ¬x(ab)z.
For ¬x(abcd)z, fix abcd = 1111, then 111111, 011110 ∈ Σ, but, e.g., 011111 6∈ Σ.
For x(abc)z, the following combinations of abc exist: 111, 101, 100. The result is trivial for 101 and
100. For 111, all combinations for x and z with 0 and 1 exist.
For ¬x(ab)z, fix ab = 10, then 110111, 010000 ∈ Σ, but there is, e.g., no 110xy0 6∈ Σ.
See Diagram 3.3.1 (page 25)
✷
Diagram 3.3.1
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x a b c d z
¬〈x | abcd | z〉(1)
〈x | abc | z〉(2)
add paths equal on abc, different on d, to compensate lacking paths in (1)
¬〈x | ab | z〉(3)
add paths different on ab, singletons on c, so they don’t disturb on abc:
seen on abc, the added paths are singletons, so they respect automatically
〈x | abc | z〉
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3.3.1 Example of a rule derived from the basic rules
We will use the following definition.
Definition 3.3.2
Given Σ as above, set
Σµ := {〈X,Y, Z〉 : X,Y, Z are pairwise disjoint subsets of I, 〈X | Y | Z〉 6∈ Σ, but for all X ′ ⊂ X
and all Z ′ ⊂ Z 〈X ′ | Y | Z〉 ∈ Σ and 〈X | Y | Z ′〉 ∈ Σ}.
We will sometimes write 〈X,X ′ | Y | Z〉 etc. for 〈X ∪X ′ | Y | Z〉.
When we write 〈X,X ′ | Y | Z〉 etc., we will tacitly assume that all sets X,X ′, Y, Z are pairwise
disjoint.
Remark 3.3.4
(1) Σµ contain thus the minimal X and Z for fixed Y, such that 〈X | Y | Z〉 6∈ Σ.
(2) By rule (b), for all 〈X | Y | Z〉 ∈ Σ, there is 〈X ′, Y, Z ′〉 ∈ Σµ X ⊆ X
′, Z ⊆ Z ′, unless all σ, τ
such that σ ↾ Y = τ ↾ Y can be combined.
As the cases can become a bit complicated, it is important to develop a good intuition and rep-
resentation of the problem. We do this now in the proof of the following fact, where we use the
result we want to prove to guide our intuition.
Fact 3.3.5
Let Σ be closed under rules (a) − (d). Then, if 〈X,X ′, X ′′ | Y | Z,Z ′, Z ′′〉 ∈ Σµ, then 〈X,Z ′ |
X ′, Y, Z ′′ | X ′′, Z〉 6∈ Σ.
Proof
Diagram 3.3.2
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X X ′ X ′′ Y Z Z ′ Z ′′
σX σX′ σX′′ σY = τY τZ τZ′ τZ′′
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
Prerequisite: σX′ = τX′ , σY = τY , σZ′′ = τZ′′
The upper line is the final aim. Line (1) expresses that we can combine all parts except sX , by
〈X ′, X ′′ | Y | Z,Z ′, Z ′′〉, which holds by 〈X,X ′, X ′′ | Y | Z,Z ′, Z ′′〉 ∈ Σµ, by similar arguments,
we can combine as indicated in lines (2)− (6). We now assume 〈X,Z ′ | X ′, Y, Z ′′ | X ′′, Z〉 ∈ Σ. So
we have to look at fragments, which agree on X ′, Y, Z ′′. This is, for instance, true for (1) and (3).
We turn this argument now into a formal proof:
Assume
(A) 〈X,Z ′ | X ′, Y, Z ′′ | X ′′, Z〉 ∈ Σ, and
(B) 〈X,X ′, X ′′ | Y | Z,Z ′, Z ′′〉 ∈ Σµ.
(C) 〈X,X ′ | Y | Z,Z ′, Z ′′〉 by (B), see line (3)
(D) 〈X | X ′, Y, Z ′, Z ′′ | X ′′, Z〉 by (A) and rule (c)
(E) 〈X | X ′, Y | Z,Z ′, Z ′′〉 by (C) and rule (c)
(F) 〈X | X ′, Y | Z ′, Z ′′〉 by (E) and (b)
(G) 〈X | X ′, Y | X ′′, Z, Z ′, Z ′′〉 by (D) and (F) and (d)
(K) 〈X | X ′, X ′′, Y | Z,Z ′, Z ′′〉 by (G) and (c)
(L) 〈X ′, X ′′ | Y | Z,Z ′, Z ′′〉 by (B), see line (1)
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(M) 〈Z,Z ′, Z ′′ | X ′, X ′′, Y | X〉 by (K) and (a)
(N) 〈Z,Z ′, Z ′′ | Y | X ′, X ′′〉 by (L) and (a)
(O) 〈Z,Z ′, Z ′′ | Y | X,X ′, X ′′〉 by (M) and (N) and (d)
(P) 〈X,X ′, X ′′ | Y | Z,Z ′, Z ′′〉 by (O) and (a).
So we conclude 〈X,X ′, X ′′ | Y | Z,Z ′, Z ′′〉 ∈ Σ, a contradiction.
Comment:
We first move Z ′, Z ′′ to the right, and then X ′, X ′′ to the left.
Moving Z ′, Z ′′ :
We use X ′′ (or Z) on the right, which not be changed, therefore we can use line (3), resulting in
(C) 〈X,X ′ | Y | Z,Z ′, Z ′′〉, or, directly
(C′) 〈X,X ′ | Y | Z ′, Z ′′〉, again by Σµ,
which is modified to
(F) 〈X | X ′, Y | Z ′, Z ′′〉, so we have on the right Z ′, Z ′′ which we want to move.
We put Z ′ in the middle (Z ′′ is there already) of (A), resulting in
(D) 〈X | X ′, Y, Z ′, Z ′′ | X ′′, Z〉.
Now we can apply (d) to (D) and (F), and have moved Z ′, Z ′′ to the right:
(G) 〈X | X ′, Y | X ′′, Z, Z ′, Z ′′〉.
We still have to move X ′ and X ′′ to the left of (G), and do this in an analogous way.
✷
Note that our results stays valid, if some of the X ′, X ′′, Z ′, Z ′′ are empty.
Aber resultat darf nicht links oder rechts ∅ sein.
Corollary 3.3.6
Let Σ be closed under rules (a) − (d). Then, if 〈X,X ′, X ′′ | Y, Y ′, Y ′′ | Z,Z ′, Z ′′〉 ∈ Σµ, then
〈X,Y ′, Z ′ | X ′, Y, Z ′′ | X ′′, Y ′′, Z〉 6∈ Σ.
Thus, if, for given Y ∪ Y ′ ∪ Y ′′, 〈X,X ′, X ′′ | Y, Y ′, Y ′′ | Z,Z ′, Z ′′〉 ∈ Σµ, then for no distribution
of X ∪ X ′ ∪ X ′′ ∪ Y ∪ Y ′ ∪ Y ′′ ∪ Z ∪ Z ′ ∪ Z ′′ such that the outward elements are non-empty,
〈X,Y ′, Z ′ | X ′, Y, Z ′′ | X ′′, Y ′′, Z〉 ∈ Σ.
Proof
Suppose 〈X,Y ′, Z ′ | X ′, Y, Z ′′ | X ′′, Y ′′, Z〉 ∈ Σ. Then by rule (c) 〈X,Z ′ | X ′, Y, Y ′, Y ′′, Z ′′ |
X ′′, Z〉 ∈ Σ. Set Y1 := Y ∪ Y ′ ∪ Y ′′. Then 〈X,Z ′ | X ′, Y1, Z ′′ | X ′′, Z〉 ∈ Σ, and 〈X,X ′, X ′′ | Y1 |
Z,Z ′, Z ′′〉 ∈ Σµ, contradicting Fact 3.3.5 (page 27). ✷
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Validity of ABC,ACD,ADE,AEB ⇒ ABE
A B C D E
σ σ = τ τ ABE?
(1) ρ1 σ σ = τ τ ABC
(2) ρ2 σ ρ1 = τ τ ACD
(3) ρ3 σ ρ2 = τ τ ADE
(4) ρ4 σ σ = τ ρ3 = τ AEB
3.4 Examples of new rules
3.4.1 New rules
Above rules (a)− (d) are not the only ones to hold, and we introduce now more complicated ones,
and show that they hold in our situation. Of the possibly infinitary rules, only (Loop1) is given
in full generality, (Loop2) is only given to illustrate that even the infinitary rule (Loop1) is not all
there is.
For warming up, we consider the following short version of (Loop1):
Example 3.4.1
ABC,ACD,ADE,AEB ⇒ ABE.
We show that this rule holds in all Σ.
Suppose A : σ, B : σ = τ, C : τ, so by ABC, there is ρ1 such that
A : ρ1 = σ, B : ρ1 = σ = τ, C : ρ1 = τ. So by ACD, there is ρ2 such that
A : ρ2 = σ, C : ρ2 = ρ1 = τ, D : ρ2 = τ. So by ADE, there is ρ3 such that
A : ρ3 = σ, D : ρ3 = ρ2 = τ, E : ρ3 = τ. So by AEB, there is ρ4 such that
A : ρ4 = σ, E : ρ4 = ρ3 = τ, B : ρ4 = τ = σ.
So ABE.
We abbreviate this reasoning by:
(1) ABC : A : σ, B : σ = τ, C : τ
(2) ACD : (1) + τ
(3) ADE : (2) + τ
(4) AEB : (3) + τ
So ABE.
It is helpful to draw a little diagram as in the following Table 3.4.1 (page 30).
.
We introduce now some new rules.
Definition 3.4.1
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• (Bin1)
XY Z,XY ′Z, Y (XZ)Y ′ ⇒ X(Y Y ′)Z
• (Bin2)
XY Z,XZY ′, Y (XZ)Y ′ ⇒ X(Y Y ′)Z
• (Loop1)
AB1B2, . . . , ABi−1Bi, ABiBi+1, ABi+1Bi+2, . . . , ABn−1Bn, ABnB1 ⇒ AB1Bn
so we turn ABnB1 around to AB1Bn.
When we have to be more precise, we will denote this condition (Loop1n) to fix the length.
• (Loop2)
ABC,ACD,DAE,DEF, FDG,FGH,HFB ⇒ HBF :
The complicated structure of these rules suggests already that the ternary relations are not the
right level of abstraction to speak about construction of functions from fragments. This is made
formal by our main result below, which shows that there is no finite characterization by such
relations. In other words, the main things happen behind the screen.
Fact 3.4.1
The new rules are valid in our situation.
Proof
• (Bin1)
(1) XYZ : X : σ, Y : σ = τ, Z : τ
(2) XY ′Z : X : σ, Y ′ : σ = τ, Z : τ
(3) Y (XZ)Y ′ : (1) + (2)
So X(Y Y ′)Z.
• (Bin2)
Let X : σ, Y : σ = τ, Y ′ : σ = τ, Z : τ
(1) XYZ : X : σ, Y : σ = τ, Z : τ
(2) XZY ′ : (1) + τ
(3) Y (XZ)Y ′ : (1) + (2)
So X(Y Y ′)Z.
• (Loop1)
(1) AB1B2 : A : σ, B1 : σ = τ, B2 : τ
(2) AB2B3 : (1) + τ
. . . .
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(i-1) ABi−1Bi : (i − 2) + τ
(i) ABiBi+1 : (i− 1) + τ
(i + 1) ABi+1Bi+2 : (i) + τ
. . . .
(n− 1) ABn−1Bn : (n− 2) + τ
(n) ABnB1 : (n− 1) + τ
So AB1Bn.
• (Loop2)
Let
(1) ABC : A : σ, B : σ = τ, C : τ
(2) ACD : 1 + τ
(3) DAE : 2 + σ
(4) DEF : 3 + σ
(5) FDG : 4 + τ
(6) FGH : 5 + τ
(7) HFB : 6 + σ
So HBF by B : σ = τ.
Note that we use here B : σ = τ, E : σ = τ, H : σ = τ, whereas the other tripels are used for other
functions.
✷
Next we show that the full (Loop1) cannot be derived from the basic rules (a) − (d) and (Bin1),
and shorter versions of (Loop1). (This is also a consequence of the sequel, but we want to point it
out right away.)
Fact 3.4.2
Let n ≥ 1, then (Loop1n) does not follow from the rules (a) − (d), (∅), (Bin1), and the shorter
versions of (Loop1)
Proof
Consider the following set of tripels L ∪ L′ over I := {a, b1, . . . , bn} :
L := {ab1b2, . . . , abibi+1, . . . , abn−1bn, abnb1},
L′ := {∅AB : A ∩B = ∅, A ∪B ⊆ I},
and close this set under symmetry (rule (a)). Call the resulting set A.
Note that, on the outside, we have ∅ or singletons, inside singletons or ∅. If the inside is ∅, one of
the outside sets must also be ∅.
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When we look at L, and define a relation < by x < y iff axy ∈ L, we see that the only <-loop is
b1 < b2 < . . . < bn < b1.
We show first that A is closed under rules (a)− (d) (see Definition 3.2.3 (page 19)).
(a) is trivial.
(b) If W = ∅ or Z = ∅, this is trivial, if W = Z, this is trivial, too.
(c) If Z ∪W = ∅, this is trivial, if Z ∪W is a singleton, so Z = ∅ or W = ∅ or Z = W. Z = ∅ or
W = ∅ are trivial, otherwise Z =W contradicts disjointness.
(d) Z = ∅ is trivial, so is W = ∅, otherwise Z =W contradicts disjointness.
(Bin1) X = ∅ or Z = ∅ are trivial, otherwise X = Z is excluded by disjointness. So we are in L′
for Y (XZ)Y ′. So Y = ∅ or Y ′ = ∅ and it is trivial.
Obviously, (Loop1n) does not hold.
We show now that all (Loop1k), 0 ≤ k < n hold.
The cases n = 1, n = 2 are trivial.
Consider the case 2 < k < n.
This has the form AB1B2, AB2B3, . . . , ABk−1Bk, ABkB1 ⇒ AB1Bk.
If A = ∅ or Bk = ∅, the condition holds.
So assume A,Bk 6= ∅. Thus, by above remark, descending to Bk−1 etc., we see that all Bi 6= ∅,
1 ≤ i ≤ k. Thus, all prerequisites are in L. Moreover, A has to be a, which is the only element
occuring repeatedly on the outside. Consider now the relation <′ defined by U <′ V iff AUV is
among the prerequisites. We then have B1 <
′ B2 <
′ . . . <′ Bk <
′ B1, where all Bi are some bj,
we see that the resulting <′-loop is too short, so the prerequisites cannot hold, and we have a
contradiction.
✷
3.5 There is no finite characterization
We turn to our main result.
3.5.1 Discussion
Consider the following simple, short, loop for illustration:
ABC,ACD,ADE,AEF,AFG,AGB ⇒ ABG - so we can turn AGB around to ABG.
Of course, this construction may be arbitrarily long.
The idea is now to make ABG false, and, to make it coherent, to make one of the interior conditions
false, too, say ADE. We describe this situation fully, i.e. enumerate all conditions which hold in
such a situation. If we make now ADE true again, we know this is not valid, so any (finite)
characterization must say “NO” to this. But as it is finite, it cannot describe all the interior tripels
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of the type ADE in a sufficiently long loop, so we just change one of them which it does not “see”
to FALSE, and it must give the same answer NO, so this fails.
Basically, we cannot describe parts of the loop, as the <||>-language is not rich enough to express
it, we see only the final outcome.
The problem is to fully describe the situation.
3.5.2 Composition of layers
A very helpful fact is the following:
Definition 3.5.1
Let Σj be function sets over I into some set K, j ∈ J.
Let Σ := { f : I → KJ : f(i) = {〈fj(i), j〉 : j ∈ J, fj ∈ Σj} }.
So any f ∈ Σ has the form f(i) = 〈f1(i), f2(i), . . . , fn(i)〉, fm ∈ Σm (we may assume J to be
finite).
Thus, given f ∈ Σ, fm ∈ Σm is defined.
Fact 3.5.1
For the above Σ 〈A | B | C〉 holds iff it holds for all Σj .
Thus, we can destroy the 〈A | B | C〉 independently, and collect the results.
Proof
The proof is trivial, and a direct consequence of the fact that f = f ′ iff for all components fj = f
′
j.
Suppose for some Σk, k ∈ J, ¬〈A | B | C〉.
So for this k there are fk, f
′
k ∈ Σk such that fk(B) = f
′
k(B), but there is no f
′′
k ∈ Σk such that
f ′′k (A) = fk(A), f
′′
k (B) = fk(B) = f
′
k(B), f
′′
k (C) = f
′
k(C) (or conversely). Consider now some
h ∈ Σ such that hk = fk, and h′ is like h, but h′k = f
′
k, so also h
′ ∈ Σ. Then h(B) = h′(B), but
there is no h′′ ∈ Σ such that h′′(A) = h(A), h′′(B) = h(B) = h′(B), h′′(C) = h′(C).
Conversely, suppose 〈A | B | C〉 for all Σj . Let h, h′ ∈ Σ such that h(B) = h′(B), so for all
j ∈ J hj(B) = h′j(B), where hj ∈ Σj , h
′
j ∈ Σj , so there are h
′′
j ∈ Σj with h
′′
j (A) = hj(A),
h′′j (B) = hj(B) = h
′
j(B), h
′′
j (C) = h
′
j(C) for all j ∈ J. Thus, h
′′ composed of the h′′j is in Σ, and
h′′(A) = h(A), h′′(B) = h(B) = h′(B), h′′(C) = h′(C).
✷
3.5.3 Systematic construction
Recall the general form of (Loop1) for singletons:
ab1b2, . . . , abi−1bi, abibi+1, abi+1bi+2, . . . , abn−1bn, abnb1 ⇒ ab1bn
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We will fully describe a model of above tripels, with the exception of ab1bn and abibi+1 which will
be made to fail, and all other 〈X | Y | Z〉 which are not in above list of tripels to preserve, will
fail, too (except for X = ∅ or Z = ∅).
Thus, the tripels to preserve are:
P := {ab1b2, . . . , abi−1bi, (BUT NOT abibi+1) , abi+1bi+2, . . . , abn−1bn, abnb1}
We use the following fact:
Fact 3.5.2
Let X ⊆ I, card(X) > 1, ΣX := { σ : I → {0, 1} : card{x ∈ X : σ(x) = 0} is even }
Then ¬ABC iff A ∩X 6= ∅, C ∩X 6= ∅, X ⊆ A ∪B ∪ C.
Proof
“⇐”:
Suppose A ∩X 6= ∅, C ∩X 6= ∅, X ⊆ A ∪B ∪ C.
Take σ such that card{x ∈ X : σ(x) = 0} is odd, then σ 6∈ ΣX . As X 6⊆ A∪B, there is τ ∈ ΣX such
that σ ↾ A∪B = τ ↾ A∪B. As X 6⊆ B∪C, there is ρ ∈ ΣX such that ρ ↾ B∪C = σ ↾ B∪C. Thus,
τ ↾ B = ρ ↾ B. If there were α ∈ ΣX such that α ↾ A ∪B = τ ↾ A ∪B and α ↾ B ∪ C = ρ ↾ B ∪C,
then α ↾ A ∪B ∪ C = σ ↾ A ∪B ∪ C, contradiction
“⇒”:
Suppose A ∩X = ∅ or C ∩X = ∅, or X 6⊆ A ∪B ∪ C. We show ABC.
Case 1: C ∩ X = ∅. Let σ, τ ∈ ΣX such that σ ↾ B = τ ↾ B. As C ∩ X = ∅, we can continue
σ ↾ A ∪B as we like.
Case 2, A ∩X = ∅, analogous.
Case 3: X 6⊆ A ∪B ∪ C. But then there is no restriction in A ∪B ∪ C.
✷
We will have to make ab1bn false, but abnb1 true. On the other hand, we will make ab1b3 false,
but ab3b1 need not be preserved.
This leads to the following definition, which helps to put order into the cases.
Definition 3.5.2
Suppose we have to destroy axy. Then
dmin(axy) := min{d({a, x, y}, {a, u, v}) : auv has to be preserved } - d the counting Hamming
distance.
Thus, dmin(ab1bn) = 0 (as abnb1 has to be preserved), dmin(ab1b3) = 1 (because ab1b2 has to be
preserved, but not ab3b1).
We introduce the following order defined from the loop prerequisites to be preserved.
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Definition 3.5.3
Order the elements by following the string of sequences to be preserved as follows:
bi+1 ≺ bi+2 ≺ . . . ≺ bn−1 ≺ bn ≺ b1 ≺ b2 ≺ . . . ≺ bi−1 ≺ bi
Note that the interruption at abibi+1 is crucial here - otherwise, there would be a cycle.
As usual,  will stand for ≺ or = .
3.5.4 The cases to consider
The elements to consider are: a, b1, . . . , bn.
Recall that the tripels to preserve are:
P := {ab1b2, . . . , abi−1bi, (BUT NOT abibi+1) , abi+1bi+2, . . . , abn−1bn, abnb1}
The 〈X | Y | Z〉 to destroy are (except when X = ∅ or Z = ∅) :
(1) all 〈X || Z〉
(2) all 〈X | Y | Z〉 such that X ∪ Y ∪ Z has > 3 elements
(3) all tripels which do not have a on the outside, e.g. bgc
(4) and the following tripels:
(the (0) will be explained below - for the moment, just ignore it)
ab1b3, . . . , ab1bn−1, ab1bn (0)
ab2b1 (0), ab2b4, . . . , ab2bn
ab3b1, ab3b2 (0), ab3b5, . . . , ab3bn
. . . .
abib1, abib2, , . . . , ALSO abibi+1, . . . , abibn
. . . .
abn−2b1, , . . . , abn−2bn−3 (0), abn−2bn
abn−1b1, , . . . , abn−1bn−2 (0),
abnb1, , . . . , abnbn−1 (0)
3.5.5 Solution of the cases
We show how to destroy all tripels mentioned above, while preserving all tripels in P.
(1) all 〈X | Y | Z〉 where X ∪ Y ∪ Z has > 3 elements:
See Fact 3.5.2 (page 35) with the X there with 4 elements, for all such X,Y, Z separately, so
all tripels in P are preserved.
(2) all 〈X | Y | Z〉 with 1 element: -
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(3) all 〈X || Z〉 :
This can be done by considering Σj := {0c, 1c}. Then, say for a, c, we have to examine the
fragments 00 and 11, but there is no 10 or 01. For 〈a | b | c〉 this is no problem, as we have
only the two 000, 111, which do not agree on b.
(4) all 〈X | Y | Z〉 with 2 elements: eliminated by 〈X || Z〉
(5) all 〈X | Y | Z〉 with 3 elements:
(5.1) a is not on the outside
(5.1.1) a is in the middle, we need ¬xay : Consider Σ with 2 functions, 0c, and the second
defined by a = 0, and all u = 1 for u 6= a. Obviously, ¬xay. Recall that all tripels to
be preserved have a on the outside, and some other element x in the middle. Then
the two functions are different on x.
(5.1.2) a is not in xyz, we need ¬xyz : Consider Σ with 2 functions, 0c, and the second
defined by a = y = 0, all u = 1 for u 6= a, u 6= y. As a is neither x nor z, ¬xyz. If
some uvw has a on the outside, say u = a, then both functions are 000 or 0vw on
this tripel, so uvw holds.
(5.2) a is on the outside, we destroy ayz :
(5.2.1) Case dmin(ayz) > 0:
Take as Σ the set of all functions with values in {0, 1}, but eliminate those with
a = y = z = 0. Then ¬ayz (we have 100, 001, 101, but not 000), but for all auv with
d({a, y, z}, {a, u, v}) > 0 auv has all possible combinations, as all combinations for
ay and az exist.
(5.2.2) Case dmin(ayz) = 0.
The elements with dmin = 0 are:
ab1bn, ab2b1, . . . , abibi−1, NOT abi+1bi, abi+2bi+1, . . . , abn−1bn−2, abnbn−1, they
were marked with (0) above.
Σ will again have 2 functions, the first is always 0c.
The second function: Always set a = 1.
We see that the tripels with dmin = 0 to be destroyed have the form ayz, where z
is the immediate ≺-predecessor of y in above order - see Definition 3.5.3 (page 36).
Conversely, those to be preserved (in P ) have the form azy, where again z is the
immediate ≺-predecessor of y.
We set z′ = 1 for all z′  z, and y′ = 0 for all y′  y. Recall that z ≺ y, so we have
the picture bi+1 = 1, . . . , z = 1, y = 0, . . . , bi = 0.
Then ¬ayz, as we have the fragments 000, 101. But azy, as we have the fragments
000, 110. Moreover, considering the successors of the sequence, we give the values
11, or 10, or 00. This results in the function fragments for auv as 111, or 110, or 100.
But the resulting fragment sets (together with 0c) are then: {000, 111}, {000, 110},
{000, 100}. They all make auv true. Thus, all tripels in P are preserved.
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3.6 Systematic construction of new rules
This section is an outline - not a formal proof - for constructing a complete rule set for our scenario.
We give here a general way how to construct new rules of the type ABC, DEF, . . . . ⇒ XYZ which
are valid in our situation.
3.6.1 Consequences of a single tripel
Let (XX ′X ′′)Y (ZZ ′Z ′′) be a tripel, then all consequences of this single tripel have the form
X(X ′Y Z ′)Z (up to symmetry).
Obviously, such X(X ′Y Z ′)Z are consequences, using rules (b) and (c).
We now give counterexamples to other forms, to show that they are not consequences in our setting.
We always assume that the outside is not ∅. We consider A = B = C = {0, 1}, and subsets of
A×B × C.
(1) Y decreases:
Consider {000, 111}, then ABC, but not A∅C.
(2) Z increases:
Consider {000, 101}, then A∅B, but not A∅(BC).
(3) X goes from left to right:
Consider {000, 110}, then (AB)C, but not A(BC)
(4) Y increases by some arbitrary W :
Consider {000, 101, 110, 011}, then A∅C, but not ABC.
3.6.2 Construction of function trees
We can construct new functions from two old functions using tripels ABC, so, in a more general
way, we have a binary function construction tree, where the old functions are the leaves, and the
new function is the root. The form of such a tree is obvious, the tripels used are either directly
given, or consequences of such tripels. In Example 3.6.3 (page 49), for instance, in the construction
of ρ2, we used ACD, but we could also have used e.g. AC(DD
′), for some D′.
3.6.3 Derivation trees
Not all such function construction trees are proof trees for a rule T1, . . . , Tn ⇒ T, where the Ti
and T are tripels.
We have to look at the logical structure of the tripels to see what we need. In order to show
T = ABC, we assume given two arbitrary functions σ and τ, which agree on B, and construct ρ
such that on A ρ = σ, on B ρ = σ = τ (the latter, σ = τ by prerequisite), and on C ρ = τ. We
will write this as A : ρ = σ, B : ρ = σ = τ, C : ρ = τ.
Heiteres 39
Thus, we have no functions at the beginning, except σ and τ, so all leaves in a proof tree for
T1, . . . , Tn ⇒ T have to be σ or τ. Moreoever, all we know about σ and τ is that they agree on
B. Thus, we can only use some T ′i = A
′B′C′ on σ and τ if B′ ⊆ B. Likewise, in the interior of
the tree, we can only use σ ↾ B = τ ↾ B, and, of course, all equalities which hold be construction.
E.g., in Example 3.6.3 (page 49), in the construction of ρ2, by construction of ρ1, C : ρ1 = τ, so
we can use ACD to construct ρ2 from ρ1 and τ.
At the root, we must have a function ρ of the form A : ρ = σ, B : ρ = σ = τ, C : ρ = τ. In Example
3.6.3 (page 49), ρ4, at the root, was constructed using AEB from ρ3 and τ. But we do not interpret
ρ4 as AEB, but as ABE, which is possible, as A : ρ4 = σ, B : ρ4 = σ = τ, E : ρ4 = τ.
Intermediate nodes can be read as an intermediate result A′B′C′ by the same criteria: They must
be functions ρ′ such that A′ : ρ′ = σ, B′ : ρ′ = σ = τ, C′ : ρ′ = τ and all B′′ such that B′′ : σ = τ
used up to this node must be subsets of B′, as B′ : σ = τ is the only hypothesis we then have.
3.6.4 Universal trees
3.6.4.1 A proof for XYZ
The following is a universal proof for XYZ:
It is a binary tree, whose leaves are all f or g.
It uses as prerequisite only Y : f = g (and equalities constructed on the way).
It makes f, g, and all other functions as different as possible.
For instance, in Example 3.6.3 (page 49), where we show that ABC,ACD,ADE,AEB ⇒ ABE,
let us assume all sets A, etc. are singletons, we then set: σ = 00000, τ = 10111, ρ1 = 00122,
ρ2 = 03113, ρ3 = 04411, ρ4 = 00551. So each new node has a new default value (2, 3, 4, 5 here).
Then we have no chance equalities, but only those we constructed. In particular, if we write the
equalities with σ, τ for every ρi thus constructed, we can read off the derived equalities. There are
no others.
The root of the tree must be a function h, which agrees on X,Y with f, and on Y, Z with g.
This is a universal proof tree, as it works for any other pair f, g, and any other internally constructed
ρi, too.
3.6.4.2 Requirements for a proof for XYZ
Suppose we have a proof for XYZ.
We cannot assume we have anything but f, g to start with.
The proof must be a binary tree, as the proof will be constructive, and we have no other construction
principles but the combination of 2 functions.
So it is a binary tree, with leaves f, g.
It must also work for f, g maximally different, i.e. outside Y, they may be different. It must also
work for the internal functions ρi maximally different. So we can only assume that f, g agree on Y,
and all other equalities must be by construction. Thus, it must also work for the universal choice
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as done above. Assume now we have constructed this way h such that h = f on X,Y, h = g on
Y, Z. This cannot be by coincidence, but it has to be a new function, constructed by the tree.
3.6.4.3 Summary: proofs for XYZ
To show XYZ, construct all universal trees for XYZ:
Begin with f, g which agree at most on Y, make them different everywhere else.
Make all internal nodes different from each other by enumerating them, and giving their number
as default values to all other arguments.
Check if the root can be seen as the construction of a h s.t. h = f on XY, h = g on YZ.
If so, we have a proof of XYZ.
All proofs of XYZ have this form, as they must work for the universal tree.
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3.6.5 Examples
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Diagram 3.6.1
Example 3.6.1σ τ
ρ1 τ
ρ2
Examples 3.6.2 and 3.6.4σ τ
ρ1
σ τ
ρ2
ρ3
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Diagram 3.6.2
Example 3.6.3
σ τ
ρ1 ρ1, using ABC - A : σ,B : σ = τ, C : ττ
ρ2 ρ2, using ACD - A : ρ1 = σ,C : ρ1 = τ,D : ττ
ρ3 ρ3, using ADE - A : ρ2 = σ,D : ρ2 = τ, E : ττ
ρ4 ρ4, using AEB - A : ρ3 = σ,E : ρ3 = τ, B : σ = τ
Interpretation: ABE, common part B : σ = τ
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Diagram 3.6.3
Example 3.6.5
σ τ
ρ1
σ τ
ρ2
ρ3
σ τ
ρ1
σ τ
ρ2
ρ4
ρ5
σ τ
ρ1
ρ6
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Explanation:
By “prerequisite” of ρi we mean the set X we used in the construction, where X : σ = τ. For
instance, in the construction of ρ2 in Example 3.6.1 (page 48), we used only that B ∪ C : ρ1 = τ
by the construction of ρ1, no additional use of some σ = τ was made.
By “common part” of ρi we mean the set X such that X : ρi = σ = τ.
Example 3.6.1
(Contraction), ABC, A(BC)D → AB(CD):
(See Diagram 3.6.1 (page 41) upper part.)
• ρ1 : A : σ, B : σ = τ, C : τ
generated by ABC from σ, τ
prerequisite B,
common part: B
ρ1 can be interpreted as the (trivial) derived tripel ABC
• ρ2 : A : ρ1 = σ, B : ρ1 = σ = τ, C : ρ1 = τ, D : τ
generated by A(BC)D from ρ1, τ
prerequisite -,
common part: B.
ρ2 can be interpreted as a derived tripel by AB(CD).
ρ2 can also be interpreted as a derived tripel by A(BC)D or A(BD)C. Note that these
possibilities can be derived from AB(CD) by rule (c), Weak Union.
Example 3.6.2
(Bin1), XYZ, XY ′Z, Y (XZ)Y ′ ⇒ X(Y Y ′)Z:
(See Diagram 3.6.1 (page 41) lower part.)
• ρ1 : X : σ, Y : σ = τ, Z : τ
generated by XY Z from σ, τ
prerequisite Y
common part: Y
• ρ2 : X : σ, Y
′ : σ = τ, Z : τ
generated by XY ′Z from σ, τ
prerequisite Y ′
common part: Y ′
• ρ3 : Y : ρ1 = σ = τ, X : ρ1 = ρ2 = σ, Z : ρ1 = ρ2 = τ, Y ′ : ρ2 = σ = τ
generated by Y (XZ)Y ′ from ρ1, ρ2
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prerequisites -
common part: Y Y ′
ρ3 can be interpreted as a derived tripel by X(Y Y
′)Z.
Example 3.6.3
(Loop1) ABC, ACD, ADE, AEB ⇒ ABE:
(See Diagram 3.6.2 (page 43).)
• ρ1 : A : σ, B : σ = τ, C : τ
generated by ABC from σ, τ
prerequisite B
common part B
• ρ2 : A : ρ1 = σ, C : ρ1 = τ, D : τ
generated by ACD from ρ1, τ
prerequisite -
common part -
ρ2 cannot be interpreted as a derived tripel, as there was a prerequisite used in its derivation
(B), but the common part in ρ2 is ∅.
• ρ3 similar to ρ2 :
ρ3 : A : ρ2 = σ, D : ρ2 = τ, E : τ
generated by ADE from ρ2, τ
prerequisite -
common part -
ρ3 cannot be interpreted as a derived tripel, as there was a prerequisite used in its derivation
(B), but the common part in ρ3 is ∅.
• ρ4 : A : ρ3 = σ, E : ρ3 = τ, B : σ = τ
generated by AEB from ρ3, τ
prerequisites -
common part B
ρ4 can be interpreted as the common part B contains all prerequisites used in its derivation.
ABE is the only non-trivial derived tripel.
Note that we could, e.g., also have replaced ACD by AC′(DC′′), where C = C′ ∪ C′′, using
rule (c), Weak Union.
Example 3.6.4
BA(CD), DF (CE), (AB)(CD)(EF ) ⇒ B(ADF )(CE):
(See Diagram 3.6.1 (page 41) lower part.)
This example shows that we may need an assumption in the interior of the tree (in the construction
of ρ3, we use D : σ = τ).
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• ρ1 : A : σ = τ, B : σ, C : τ, D : τ
generated by BA(CD) from σ, τ
prerequisites A
common part A
• ρ2 : C : τ, D : σ, E : τ, F : σ = τ
generated by DF (CE) from σ, τ
prerequisite F
common part F
• ρ3 : A: ρ1 = σ = τ, B : ρ3 = σ, C : ρ1 = ρ2 = τ, D : ρ1 = ρ2 = σ = τ, E : ρ2 = τ,
F : ρ2 = σ = τ
generated by (AB)(CD)(EF ) from ρ1, ρ2
prerequisite D
common part ADF
So ρ3 can be seen as the derived tripel B(ADF )(CE) (but NOT as (AB)(DF )(CE) etc., as
DF does not contain ADF.
Example 3.6.5
(AA′)BC, AD(CD′), (AB′)C(C′D), (A′B′)C(C′D′), (AD)(B′CC′)(A′D′), BC(ADD′) ⇒
A(BD)(CD′):
(See Diagram 3.6.3 (page 45).)
This example shows that we may need an equality (here α and β in the construction of ρ5) which
is not related to σ and τ. Of course, we cannot use it as an assumption, but we know the equality
by construction.
α and β will not be known, they are fixed, unknown fragments.
• ρ1 : A : σ, A′ : σ, B : σ = τ, B′ : α, C : τ
generated by (AA′)BC from σ, τ
prerequisites B
common part B
• ρ2 : A : σ, C : τ, C′ : β, D : σ = τ, D′ : τ
generated by AD(CD′) from σ and τ
prerequisite D
common part D
• ρ3 : A : σ, B′ : α, C : τ, C′ : β, D : σ = τ
generated by (AB′)C(C′D) from ρ1 and ρ2
prerequisite -
common part D
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• ρ4 : A
′ : σ, B′ : α, C : τ, C′ : β, D′ : τ
Generated by (A′B′)C(C′D′) from ρ1 and ρ2
prerequisites -
common part -
• ρ5 : A : σ, A′ : σ, B′ : α, C : τ, C′ : β, D : τ, D′ : τ
generated by (AD)(B′CC′)(A′D′) from ρ3 and ρ4
prerequisites - (note that equality on B′ and C′ is by construction of ρ3 and ρ4, and not by
a prerequisite on σ and τ)
common part: D
• ρ6 : A : σ, B : σ = τ, C : τ, D : σ = τ, D′ : τ
generated by BC(ADD′) from ρ1 and ρ5
prerequisites -
common part: BD
Thus, ρ6 may be seen as derived tripel A(BD)(CD
′)
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Chapter 4
Subideal cases
4.1 The problem and the outline of a solution
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Diagram 4.1.1
A A′
B
C
A A′
B
C
One of the advantages of defeasible inheritance systems is the ability to treat subideal cases.
In the left hand diagram, (see Diagram 4.1.1 (page 53)), C inherits from B A and A′. This is the
ideal case. In the right hand diagram, C does not have property A, the direct link C 6→ A prevents
this, but it still inherits A′ from B, this is the subideal case.
When we interpret A by “blond”, A′ by “tall”, B by “Swede”, C by a subset of “Swedes”, which are
not blond, we have the classical dark haired Swedes problem. Even dark haired Swedes should be
tall. Preferential structures have a problem with this, as they do not say anything about subideal
cases (where not all properties which hold in the minimal models, are valid).
Inheritance systems are modular in the following sense: the conditions which are inherited are
clearly and separately spelled out, A and A′ here. In preferential structures, we have - in principle
- one tight knot of ideal cases, and no way to separate the different properties - without additional
machinery. It is this machinery we want to examine here.
Heiteres 55
In inheritance systems, in principle, all combinations are possible: A∧A′ ∧B∧C, A∧A′ ∧B∧¬C,
. . . , ¬A ∧ ¬A′ ∧ ¬B ∧ ¬C. We might not mention all, but there is no contradiction to add nodes
and arrows to make them visible. E.g., we can introduce D to one of the diagrams, with the
arrows D → A, D 6→ A′, D → B, D 6→ C, etc. So, the nodes code implicitly logically independent
possibilities, and we use this idea for preferential structures.
Suppose we have a language p, q, r, and a preferential structure where True ∼| p∧q∧r. Intuitively,
we want to “decompose” this into 3 rules: prefer p over ¬p, q over ¬q, r over ¬r. Note that we can
describe µ(True) by p∧q∧r, but also by the conjunction of 7 rules, excluding all other models one
by one: ¬(pq¬r), etc. But these rules are not independent: There are cases with ¬(pq¬r)∧¬(p¬qr),
but there is no case with (pq¬r) ∧ (p¬qr).
So, the solutions seems to be, roughly: Find the finest (this exists, see Fact 3.4 in [GS09b])
independent factorization f1, . . . , fn describing µ(X), and for X
′ ⊆ X with X ′ ∩ µ(X) = ∅ (when
X ′∩µ(X) 6= ∅, preferential structures take care of this), apply as many of the fi to X ′ as possible.
The “as many” should probably be determined by the subset relation, and not by counting, as it
is not sure that we are prepared to compensate the failure of one fi by the validity of another fi′ .
So, we “know” how to inherit properties to subideal cases in preferential structures.
Another basic idea of inheritance systems is specificity: Conflicts are, if possible, solved by speci-
ficity. Tweety the penguin inherits egg-laying from birds, but not-flying from penguins, and not
flying from birds, as penguins are more specific than birds. We have to carry this over to our
approach to preferential structures. The general situation is as follows: We have a set X, and
inherit from Y1, . . . , Yn factors f1,1, . . . , f1,m1 , . . . , fn,1, . . . , f1,mn , where the fi,j are the factors of
µ(Yi). The Yi are partially ordered, and it seems natural to do some “merger” of the fi,j , respecting
priority determined by specificity. It is probably adequate to take an “axiom based” approach,
taking a suitable subset of the fi,j , as formalisms coming up with some compromise (e.g. deter-
mined by some distance between models) are not only different from the inheritance formalism,
but will probably give unexpected results.
The situation is more complicated than in inheritance, as the fi,j need not be independent when
considering different i’s. Some approach like the following is probably reasonable:
(1) Consider the strongest Yi, ordered by specificity, and their fi,j .
(2) Consider all fi,j for those Yi. Identify minimal inconsistent sets of those fi,j , and erase all
fi,j involved (this corresponds to direct scepticism in inheritance), until a consistent set of fi,j is
obtained.
(3) Consider the next strongest Yi′ , and add similar to step (2) new fi′,j , while preserving the fi,j
already chosen, and considering consistency together with the fi,j already chosen.
(4) Etc., until all Yi are done with.
4.2 Comments
(1) We have here essentially a multi-valued approach. Not only classical validity as maximally
strong, and preferential structure as next strongest, but, partially ordered by specificity,
arbitrarily many levels of strength.
(2) Note that preferential structures take care automatically of specificity for the ideal case,
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basically, as we can handle all sets independently. Here, we have to add a formalism to
handle specificity.
(3) Higher preferential structures, see [GS08f], can code our approach, but it is not sure that the
coding would be natural.
(4) Independence as discussed above might need to be refined. For instance, we might consider
independence inside X when considering µ(X).
(5) We can also ask whether we should not perhaps consider independence of X −µ(X), instead
of independence of µ(X). The following example gives an answer:
Example 4.2.1
Consider the language {p, q}.
(1) Let µ(pq,¬pq, p¬q,¬p¬q) = pq. We have two rules, p < ¬p, q < ¬q, and apply both.
(2) µ(pq,¬pq, p¬q,¬p¬q) = (pq,¬pq, p¬q), we avoid ¬p¬q. But we do not avoid ¬p and ¬q,
the rule is to avoid one of them. This does not seem to be such a good rule. In particular,
factorization as above does not work, contrary to the symmetric case (1).
(6) Note that we can see the factorization of µ(X) as an approximation of the ideal case µ(X)
by a set of rules.
Chapter 5
Coding graphs by multisets
5.1 Introduction
This is a short comment on [AGS09].
We examine here the coding of graphs by sets and multisets.
In the following, we abbreviate a set of labels or elements like {a, b, c} by abc, etc.
5.2 Even the case with simple (not multi) sets is quite
complicated
We consider here graphs generated by a subset of some powerset (with the natural ordering by
inclusion), and show that we need a certain number of atomic labels to represent them.
The examples show that it is probably quite difficult to come up with a minimal number of elements
- let alone working with multisets. Example 5.2.1 (page 57) shows how complicated things can
become. There is an interplay of chains up and down, and antichains involved.
Thus, I am quite sceptical about a good solution to the problem.
Moreover, Example 5.3.1 (page 58) shows that an inductive construction is impossible.
Example 5.2.1
Consider the graph generated by the subset {abcdef, abcd, abc, ab, a, bcef, cef, ef, e, f} of
P(abcdef).
(A label of the node corresponding to) abcd has to have at least 4 elements, by a ≺ ab ≺ abc ≺ abcd,
and e, f have to have at least 4 elements less than the top node abcdef.
All maximal antichains have 3 elements, e.g., {abcd, e, f}. The longest chains have 5 elements.
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But we cannot use only 5 elements for labels, as any antichain containing a node with 4 elements
can have size at most 2.
5.3 There is no inductive algorithm by the natural ordering
for the simple set case
Example 5.3.1
This example shows that, in general, an inductive procedure is impossible.
Recall that, for a given set of n elements, the number of subsets of size m < n is n!(n−m)!∗m! .
Take now a structure consisting of one antichain with 20 elements, and nothing else. This can be
represented with 6 elements and subsets of size 3, as 6!3!∗3! = 20.
Take a structure with 4 antichains, each of size 20, and one above the other. Thus, the size of the
representing sets will increase at least by 1 from the lowest antichain to the next, etc.
As we are not allowed to look ahead, we begin again with subsets of size 3 of a set of 6 atomic
labels for the lowest antichain. So the next antichain must consist of sets of at least 4 elements,
the next of 5, the final of 6. Thus, we need at least 8 elements for representation, as 8!6!∗2! = 28, 7
elements will not do.
If, however, we had begun with subsets of size 2 of a 7 element set, by 7!5!∗2! = 21, we could have
in the top layer only 5 element subsets, and this is again possible, so 7 elements will do. But we
have to look at the whole structure to see this.
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5.4 The multiset case
We work with a set of atomic labels L := {a} ∪B, where a may occur several times, this will be
written an for n times a, etc.
We have the following trivial fact:
Fact 5.4.1
(1) Let B′ ⊆ B, then anB′ and amB′ are comparabel, as n ≤ m or m ≤ n.
(2) Let B′ ⊂ B′′ ⊆ B, then anB′ is not comparabel to amB′′ iff n > m.
Corollary 5.4.2
(1) To code an antichain of size 2n, we need B of size at least n.
(2) We can code an antichain of size 2n with B of size n.
Proof
(1) Suppose B is smaller, then card(P(B)) < 2n, so two elements of the antichain are coded by
the same B′ ⊆ B, contradicting Fact 5.4.1 (page 59), (1).
(2) Let (B′) be the exponent of the (unique by Fact 5.4.1 (page 59), (1)) a(B
′)B′. Code the elements
of the antichain by {a(B
′)B′ : B′ ⊆ B}, where B′ ⊂ B′′ implies (B′′) < (B′). Then the codes are
pairwise incomparable by Fact 5.4.1 (page 59), (2). Note that (∅) is the biggest exponent, and
(B) the smallest. (The idea is that, if the B-part of two codes is comparabel, we make the a-part
comparabel in the other direction, so the whole codes are incomparabel.)
✷
Example 5.4.1
Consider the structure X ≺ Y and an isolated Z.
Obviously, we need at least one b. We may code this by a ≺ a2, b, or, by b ≺ ab, a2, and we have
two, non-isomorphic, codings.
In the following, we will code a bottom antichain of size 2n by {a(B
′)B′ : B′ ⊆ B}, where B has n
elements.
5.5 There is no inductive algorithm by the natural ordering
for the multiset case
We now show that an upward inductive algorithm, using the natural ordering, is impossible. For
this, we discuss progressively more complicated examples. The last one, Example 5.5.3 (page 61),
is perhaps the most interesting, as it shows that we have to consider an arbitrarily deep and wide
substructure (with non-trivial interior nodes), to see that a decision taken lower down cannot be
upheld.
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Example 5.5.1
Consider an antichain of 4 elements at the bottom, say A,B,C,D.
We might code this with the labels abc, a2b, a2c, a3.
In the next level, we have an antichain of 2 elements, say X,Y, and they have both the same
predecessors, say A,B.
Suppose A was coded by a3, B by a2b. Then we can code X by a5b, Y by a4bc, and need no new
label.
Suppose now that A was coded by abc, B by a2b. Then X and Y must include a2bc, we may for
instance make X a4bc, but now we have to introduce a new variable, say d, and make Y a3bcd.
So, we have to look ahead. But it can be much more complicated. Take again above example.
Suppose we have now two antichains, X,Y, and X ′, Y ′, one is above A,B, the other above C,D.
Which one will have the abc? If X,Y is higher than X ′, Y ′, then we might have needed already
d elsewhere, so we can use it without additional cost. But X might also be higher than X ′, Y ′
higher than Y. What shall we do?
Example 5.5.2
This example shows that even the initial step of coding 4 elements with 3 labels, as done above,
might not always work: again, we have to look ahead.
Consider again an antichain of 4 elements at the bottom, say A,B,C,D. Again, we might code
this with the labels abc, a2b, a2c, a3.
Suppose we have in the second layer one new point above each pair from A,B,C,D. One of the
bottom nodes will be coded by anbc, another by an
′
b, another by an
′′
c. Suppose n′ ≥ n′′. Let X be
above the bottom elements coded by an
′
b and anbc. Then it will also be above the bottom element
coded by an
′′
c. But this is not wanted.
Thus, in this situation, we need a new label, say d, to code the element coded by anbc.
(We could also put the second layer nodes X on “stilts”, so they will have arbitrary height, like
anb ≺ an+1b ≺ an+2b ≺ . . . ≺ X, etc., so we have to climb up arbitrarily high to see the problem.)
Fact 5.5.1
Consider a bottom antichain with elements a(B
′)B′, where B′ ⊆ B.
Fix now D ⊆ B, let D′ := B − D, and consider X := {a(D
′E)D′E : E ⊆ D}. Then, of course,
(D′) = (D′∅) > (D′E) for all E 6= ∅.
Let X = X ′ ∪ X ′′, where X ′, X ′′ are disjoint and have the same cardinality, and introduce two
new nodes, B′ and B′′, such that B′ ≻ A′ for all A′ ∈ X ′, B′′ ≻ A′′ for all A′′ ∈ X ′′, but for no
A′′ ∈ X ′′ B′ ≻ A′′, and for no A′ ∈ X ′ B′′ ≻ A′.
Suppose without loss of generality a(D
′)D′ ∈ X ′. Then there is b ∈ D such that for no a(D
′E)D′E ∈
X ′, b ∈ E. (Otherwise, by maximality of (D′), all x ∈ X would be below A′.)
On the other hand, for cardinality reasons, there cannot be two such b ∈ D.
✷
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Example 5.5.3
Using n+1 atomic labels, L := {a, b0, . . . , bn−1}, we can code a bottom antichain X0,0, . . . , X0,2n−1
as follows: Work in the binary system. Set B := {b0, . . . , bn−1}, and code B
′ ⊆ B by c(B′) :=
Σ{2i : bi ∈ B′}. This gives a natural total order on P(B), and we use the inverse of this order for the
exponent of a. Thus, as it should be, (∅) = (0, . . . , 0) is the biggest exponent, and (B) = (1, . . . , 1)
the smallest exponent.
In more detail, code X0,i by a
(i)i, where i is written in binary, i coding as above a subset of B.
Thus, X0,0 is coded by a
(∅)∅, X0,1 by a(0...1)0 . . . 1 = a(b0)b0, X0,2 by a(0...10)0 . . . 10 = a(b1)b1, etc.,
up to X0,2n−1 = a
(bn−1...b0)bn−1 . . . b0.
Then create new nodes above the bottom level, etc., always grouping successive lower nodes to-
gether, as follows:
X1,0, . . . , X1,2n−1−1
X1,i ≻ X0,i∗2, X0,i∗2+1
Xk,0, . . . , Xk,2n−k−1
Xk,i ≻ Xk−1,i∗2, Xk−1,i∗2+1
up to k = n− 1 (included).
The labelling of the new nodes is made by taking the union of lower labels. Our ordering of the
exponents shows that this is possible, with exactly the relations as defined. See Diagram 5.5.1
(page 61) for an example with n = 3.
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Diagram 5.5.1
a(∅) a(b)b a(c)c a(bc)bc a(d)d a(bd)bd a(cd)cd a(bcd)bcd X0,i
000 001 010 011 100 101 110 111
X0,0 X0,1 X0,2 X0,3 X0,4 X0,5 X0,6 X0,7
a(∅)b a(c)bc a(d)bd a(cd)bcd X1,i
a(∅)bc a(d)bcd X2,i
a(∅)bd a(c)bcd
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For instance, (d) is the highest exponent in the right half, but all exponents on the left half are
bigger than (d). Thus, all nodes on the right half are below a(d)bcd, and none on the left is below
a(d)bcd. For a(∅)bc, all nodes on the right half contain d, so they are not below a(∅)bc, etc. We
add now two additional nodes, a(∅)bd, and a(c)bcd. The latter will have more nodes below it than
intended - see the broken line in the diagram. Consider first the node labelled a(∅)bd. The nodes
below a(cd)bcd contain c, so they are not concerned, the same holds for those below a(c)bc. But
it is impossible to add the node a(c)bcd : By (c) > (d) > (bd), we see that a(d)d ≺ a(c)bcd and
a(bd)bd ≺ a(c)bcd, a contradiction.
This is no accident, it does not depend on the specific choice and distribution of the base labels, as
we show now. “(labelled . . . )” refers to the example for n = 3, described in Diagram 5.5.1 (page
61).
Consider, for an arbitrary labelling, Xn−1,0 (labelled by a
(∅)bc) and Xn−1,1 (labelled by a
(d)bcd)
(these are all which are on level n). One of them has to be above a(∅), without loss of generality,
let this be Xn−1,0. Note that (∅) has to be the strictly biggest exponent, otherwise we have no
antichain. One of the atomic labels, say bj (d in the diagram) does not occur in the labelling of
Xn−1,0, otherwise, all bottom nodes would be below Xn−1,0. For cardinality reasons, all others
have to occur in the labelling of Xn−1,0, see Fact 5.5.1 (page 60). Moreover, bj occurs in all labels
of the bottom nodes below Xn−1,1, and all combinations of the other bk occur below Xn−1,1. In
particular, we have a(bj)bj and a
(bn−1...b0)bn−1 . . . b0 below Xn−1,1, and, by the same reasoning,
(bj) is the strictly biggest exponent below Xn−1,1.
We split now Xn−1,0 into Xn−2,0 (labelled a
(∅)b) and Xn−2,1 (labelled a
(c)bc) and repeat the
argument, using again Fact 5.5.1 (page 60).
Suppose, without loss of generality, a(∅)∅ is below Xn−2,0, so there must be some a
(bj′ )bj′ (labelled
a(c)c) below Xn−2,1. As a
(bj′ )bj′ is not below Xn−1,1, (bj′ ) > (bj). Split now Xn−1,1 into Xn−2,2
(labelled a(d)bd) and Xn−2,3 (labelled a
(cd)bcd), and suppose without loss of generality a(bj)bj is
below Xn−2,2. Create a new node X (labelled a
(c)bcd) above Xn−2,1 and Xn−2,3. Then it is bigger
than a(bj′ )bj′ , so its label has the exponent (bj′ ), but it is also above a
(bn−1...b0)bn−1 . . . b0 (labelled
a(bcd)bcd), so it is also above a(bj)bj , a contradiction by (bj′ ) > (bj). But we detect this only at
level n−2, and we have to look at arbitrarily big subsets of the construction (in width and depth!)
to find a contradiction. Thus, in a strong sense, a recursion is impossible.
Note that we may modify above example, e.g., introduce a smallest node with label ∅, and then
lift the whole construction by adding everywhere a new set of labels, so we can embed it into an
arbitrary diagram. Thus, the problem is not only with the base level.
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5.6 Generalization
We identify the different situations or objects (cameras, etc.) with propositional models, and the
properties with propositional variables. The models may be defined only partially.
To distinguish different models, we name them. Thus, we might have different models with the
same properties, but with different names. We assume that all values can only be 0/1 (the bull
example needs more values).
I think there are different ways to treat the situation:
(1) We have only a local ranking, which is based on the values of the propositional variables.
Based on this ranking, we try to complete the partially defined models. Gaps are permitted
(undefined values), if there is a gap, we just forget this value for the ranking. Ifm ≺ m′ ≺ m′′,
and m′(p) is undefined, then we try to complete it, so that m(p) ≤ m′(p) ≤ m′′(p).
(2) We have, in addition, a global ranking, where model m may be considered better than model
m′, for some external reason.
In this case, we try to complete the undefined values according to local and global ranking.
(3) We have, in addition, a ranking of the propositional variables, where p might be stronger
than p′, etc. In this case, we can work within one model, e.g., as follows: Ifm(p) is “positive”,
and m(p′) unknown, then we assume that m(p′) is positive, too.
We then see the following:
(1) We have a structure on the language, as 1 is better than 0. In the third case above, we have
an order on the variables, too, so even more structure. See p. 10 of our new book.
(2) We may have a “soft” ranking, where some properties might be unknown, then the known
properties determine the ranking.
In this case, we fill in the unknown properties to coincide with the soft ranking.
(3) I do not see why it is necessary to have only one (?) in the matrix.
In particular, we may sometimes split 1 big matrix with two (?) into 2 small matrices with
1 (?) each.
(4) This way of ordering reminds me of the ordering in deontic logic, where situations may be
better in several aspects.
(5) It might be possible to generalize from elementary properties (propos. variables) to formulas.
(6) The locality of reasoning makes it likely that we have interpolation - if we find a nice way to
express it.
(7) What are the laws of this reasoning? If we modify the matrices, what stays constant, what
changes, and how?
(8) If we admit, say, 2 holes, we can examine Cumulativity: Is the result the same, when we fill
both at the same time, or, first 1, then with the new matrix, 2?
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(9) I think we can see this as a special case of preferential structures: Replace the (?) with
branching into 2 models, then prefer the one which fits in better.
(10) Vielleicht kann ich auch pref. Modelle wie oben als Matrix sehen, und dann geometrisch
arbeiten?
(11) Mit Implikationen machen?
(12) aus Bahnfahrt:
• wieso nicht learning/detecting regularity?
• hat an force bei a gedacht, nicht an min. labels, drum die vielen Fehler
• Ist das nicht detecting causality?
• detect order, tendency
• Ist Ansatz 0/1 einzusetzen, um zu sehen, was besser passt, gerechtfertigt? Koennte das
nicht eine Tendenz verschleiern?
Dov,
I have a few questions and remarks, which we might discuss on the phone:
(1) The problem differs from an interpolation problem, as, in the latter, the order is give, here it
has to be found. Correct?
(2) Is finding regularities in one dimension (product, or model) really the same as finding them in
the other dimension (properties)?
(3) I am not sure that the coding of “force” by αn is really what you want, and if the multiset
approach is the right one. Do you have more on this?
(4) Detecting regularities is traditionally a learning problem, I think. Is there a reason why this
is not mentioned? Perhaps, we should work with someone from the learning community?
(5) You examine which of the possibilities give a better fit, 0 or 1 in the place of?. Does this
always correspond to finding regularities? This sounds like a stupid question, but I am not sure
your answer is always true. If so, it might need a proof.
Karl
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Chapter 6
Re-considering some principles of
non-monotonic logics
6.1 Introduction
We try to take a fresh look at some fundamental ideas of non-monotonic logics.
In particular, we
(1) examine the step from “normally . . . ” to “normal”
(2) differentiate the consistency criterion of Reiter defaults
(3) look at the “inference greed” of Reiter defaults, and other formalisms like inheritance, and
give it an intuitive semantics through tentative theory formation, and connect it to inductive
reasoning
(4) describe that specificity is not always a good criterion
(5) suggest a more modular approach a la inheritance
(6) examine subset systems more general than principal filters used in preferential structures
(7) describe how to generalize from propositional to first order defaults
(8) introduce a notion of validity of a default in a classical model, and describe how to use it to
solve conflicts and determine “good” models
(9) finally, take a closer look at inheritance and motivate the use of direct scepticism or of the
intersection of extensions, and also re-consider the translation of inheritance to other systems
by examining their language.
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We stress those aspects which seem elementary, “first principles” to us, and try to translate pro-
cedural aspects into a more declarative content. The text is more questions and problems than
answers.
6.2 General remarks
6.2.1 Not all defaults are about normality
Medical students are told: “if you hear hoofbeat, think horses, not zebras”. The meaning is,
of course, first think of normal, usual situations, and not exotic illnesses. When we walk in
the country, and hear the hissing of a snake, the advice might be: “think rattle snakes, not
garter snakes”, though the latter might be more common. The reason is, to treat first potentially
dangerous situations.
Both describe default reasoning, but for different purposes (they can, however, both be summarized
as “useful” reasoning, the first to treat common situations, the second to avoid dangers). For the
moment, we treat both as advice for acting (reasoning), or rules, and will write (hoofbeat:horse)
and (hissing:rattler). They are justified by different reasons, we have, so far, no formal justification
or semantics, and no way to treat a system of such rules. But we are aware that the rules are
“rough”, it might be a zebra, it might be a garter snake, after all.
Note that the default rule we chose to apply may depend on the context. When we walk in
the countryside, we use the cautious snake rule, when we observe from a safe position, we may
use the rule that garter snakes are more common after all, so we conjecture it is a garter snake,
(hissing:garter-snake).
6.2.2 Systems of rules, subideal cases
We have many rules for birds, (birds:feathers), (birds:fly), (birds:lay-eggs), etc. When we write
down all rules about birds, it might be that no single bird satisfies all, the total set of rules for birds
behaves like the lottery paradox. We may also have a mixture of rules with different motivations.
In medical diagnosis, one rule might be to check for a common and not so serious illness, another
rule to exclude a rare, but dangerous and rapidly developping one. We will probably decide about
the latter first, then turn to the common illness, and if both are wrong, investigate further. Note
that we do not have here just “normal” and “abnormal” cases, but three classes - just as we
sometimes have three cases to consider for a mathematical proof.
6.3 Clarification of notions: Normality and consistency
6.3.1 Normality
6.3.1.1 From “normally” to “normal”
There is an important - but often overlooked, see the author’s own work - change from “normally,
birds fly” to “normal birds fly”. The latter presupposes that normal birds, the ideal bird case,
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exist, the former does not, it considers also partially normal birds. The ideal case need not exist,
as the lottery paradox shows. The intersection of the bird sets with “normal” properties might be
empty - or meaninglessly small.
6.3.1.2 The behaviour of “normal” vs. finding normal elements
Preferential structures and their abstract treatment are about the normal case. They investigate
the properties of normality, of the ideal case. They do not investigate the subideal case, where
only some properties of the ideal case are satisfied. This is done, implicitly, by Reiter defaults,
defeasible inheritance, etc., where we preserve as many normal properties as possible. Preferential
structures also do not investigate which elements (in the first order case) are normal, or as normal
as possible. This is done by first order Reiter defaults, where as many elements as possible are
made as normal as possible.
6.3.2 The consistency criterion for Reiter defaults (and other for-
malisms)
A Reiter default is allowed to fire unless the consistency criterion is violated. But the inconsistency
might be against a classical background theory, or against another default, or a combination of
other defaults, etc. In particular, criteria like specificity might be important. Thus, a whole theory
of elimination of inconsistencies may be necessary to solve conflicts - as it is brought to light in
defeasible inheritance. In the first order case, which elements are normal, and to which degree, is
also solved by an, implicitly, complicated theory.
Note that preferential structures have total control of minimal elements, so there is no room for
downward inheriting properties - unless we want to work with special structures - and potential
conflicts are obvious.
6.4 The implicit extension of conjectures
6.4.1 Inference greed
Reiter defaults (and, e.g., inheritance networks) are “inference greedy” in the following triple sense:
(1) The default (: φ) will “fire”, even if we know already ψ, (: φ) is implicitly broken down to
subsets - contrary to preferential structures, where we do not have this homogeneity.
(2) In the default set {(: φ), (: φ′)}, if (: φ) cannot fire (as ¬φ holds), (: φ′) may still be able
to fire - in preferential structures, we know nothing beyond classical logic about not totally
normal, ideal, elements, whereas defaults can also treat the subideal case.
(3) Open defaults (: φ(x)) make as many elements as possible normal, i.e. satisfy φ(x).
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6.4.1.1 A justification
It seems difficult to find a semantics in the usual sense for this behaviour. Why should the
world “feel” a pressure for normality? Why should there be a direction towards maximal possible
normality in the world?
The only idea the present author had was to give an (informal) semantics of both the world and
our theory building about the world. My, certainly naive, idea is in the platonic tradition. We
make a theory about the world, knowing that it is only an approximation, but try to extend it
as far as possible (until contradictions - to be elaborated, see above, Section 6.3.2 (page 69)).
The basic assumption is that the world is regular, and we can, in principle, describe it in simple
terms, but our description will not be perfect. It is an assumption about homogeneity of the world,
and independence of properties, unless proven otherwise. (It is also an exploratory approach: we
explore the world, and try to be conservative, in the sense of simplicity. As such, it has much in
common with inductive reasoning.)
Thus, we have a pragmatic view, make as many defaults hold as possible, also for subsets, and
for as many elements as possible in the first order case. We do not seek “best” knowledge, about
absolutely normal cases, but, more modestly, distinguish between levels of knowledge, probabilities,
like truth values in inheritance networks. This can then be formalized by a simple relation of
“better” between models and elements, forgetting the human element of extending knowledge.
6.4.2 Remarks on specificity
The specificity criterion for deciding conflicts is one of the basic tenets of non-monotonic reasoning.
If Tweety is a penguin, we conclude that the more specific information, that penguins don’t fly,
will win over the more general information that birds fly. If there is no conflict, we assume that
subsets behave like supersets - see above.
The specificity criterion is fine for classification, as we assume that many properties will be inherited
from super- to subclass, but not all. Subclasses may have a somewhat modified “building plan”.
But specificity is irrelevant for other properties - for example for “destructive” properties. We
will not try to find out if dead penguins can still walk, once we understood that dead animals
cannot walk. Something in the “construction” of the animal has gone wrong, and we do not
assume normal life functioning any more. Thus, we have to distinguish properties which “feel”
specificity, and those which do not. (Likewise, we will not investigate how the dead specimens of a
newly discovered bird behave - we know it already, it is a “transverse” property, and no inductive
reasoning is necessary.)
This distinction goes beyond classical logic, as we distinguish different types of predivates (or
propositional variables, in the propositional case).
“Penguin” is not a capacity like flying, but a complex of properties. Similarly, we do diagnosis,
e.g., for an illness, with distinctive properties, which serve as indicators.
Note that specificity can be seen as an approximation: a more specific set B is a better approx-
imation to A than less specific set C : A ⊆ B ⊆ C But we do not really work with specificity
as a set-wise relation: Tweety, a kolibri, a blackbird, is a small set, but it seems useless. We
need “well defined” small sets, like penguins, we need property-wise or class-wise (like penguin)
approximation.
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6.4.3 Induction
The justification for the inference greedy behaviour of defaults makes a connection to inductive
logic plausible. Inductive reasoning is also inference greedy, we try to push our knowledge as far as
possible. Of course, the reasoning goes upward, towards the more general case, and not downward
to subsets. Still, one should explore further if there are common points. In particular:
(1) Is induction only inverse to the downward extension of knowledge of defaults, or are there
deeper differences?
(2) Can we transfer results and rules from one domain to the other?
(3) Can we define inductive reasoning by the generalization which is best extended downward in
default reasoning (or vice versa)? So one will be a reflection of the other?
(4) Can we learn from “real” science, how physicists, or researchers in life sciences, determine
if a theory is thought to be sufficiently corroborated? What does “practical philosophy of
science” say? How do they exclude “disturbing influences”? What does this mean for default
reasoning? Can we reflect this to default reasoning?
(5) Can the degree of inconsistency of Section 6.8 (page 74) be generalized to induction?
6.5 Modularity
An attractive feature of inheritance systems is their modularity. Modularity corresponds also to
the description of information as approximation. We have several “aims”, building blocks of a
description, and put them together as well as possible, in a principled way, based on a basically
modular world itself.
If we take this idea seriously, we have not one big language and theory, but small fragments
of non-monotonic theories, and - non-monotonic - operators on those fragments, which combine
them, similar to a revision of non-monotonic logics by non-monotonic logics. (Combining different
languages is, e.g., a multiplication of models, etc.)
6.6 Subset systems beyond principal filters
Preferential structures (in the minimal version) generate principal filters on sets, F(X) := {A :
µ(X) ⊆ A ⊆ X}, together with coherence properties between filters over different sets, X, X ′, etc.
They have an intuitive interpretation by the notion of size. The minimal elements are the ideal
cases, and everything non-minimal is negligeable, or small.
The lottery paradox and the limit version of preferential structures motivate to consider more
general filters, or even weak filters.
Default systems also generate subset systems. E.g., {(: φ), (: ψ)} generate the “good” subsets
{m : m |= φ}, {m : m |= ψ}, {m : m |= φ ∧ ψ}, and perhaps {m : m |= φ ∨ ψ}. Considering the
default system {(: φ ∨ ψ), (: ψ)} shows that {{m : m |= φ ∨ ψ}, {m : m |= ψ}} and {{m : m |= ψ}}
should not be considered equivalent. In the latter, only {m : m |= ψ} is “good”, in the former,
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also {m : m |= φ ∨ ψ} will be considered good, though not as good as {m : m |= ψ}. This is
intuitive, as the default (: ψ) might not be able to fire, but the default (: φ ∨ ψ) may - the system
{(: φ ∨ ψ), (: ψ)} is not equivalent to the system {(: ψ)}. If we interpret ψ as the ideal case,
then both describe the same ideal case, or limit, but not the same subideal cases. (This is like
contrary-to-duty conditionals.)
Let N (X) denote such abstract systems.
The following questions arise about N (X) :
(1) What are reasonable closure properties of N (X)?
• A first idea is to proceed as for deontic logic: Take all model sets derived from single
defaults, and close under union and intersection.
• If
⋂
N (X) = ∅, we should probably consider only non-empty intersections.
• Should X ∈ N (X)? Probably not.
• Is a system like {A,X −A} reasonable? Are systems with
⋃
N (X) = X reasonable?
• Can different closure properties code different intuitions?
• In which cases does N (X) describe an approximation of ideal cases?
(2) Can we compare two different N (X), N ′(X), e.g., if ∀A ∈ N (X)∃A′ ∈ N ′(X).A′ ⊆ A, then
N ′(X) is at least as sharp as N (X) is?
(3) What are reasonable coherence conditions between N (X) and N (X ′)
(4) Can we find an intuitive interpretation of such systems, as we can interpret µ(X) by size?
(5) Can we generate such systems locally by a relation, as we did for µ(X)? By higher order,
reactive, relations?
(6) If N (X) is generated by a probability (as for the lottery paradox), are there special laws,
resulting from substitution and sums?
E.g.: if {x, y} 6∈ N (X), {x, y′}, {x′, y} ∈ N (X), then {x′, y′} ∈ N (X)?
(7) Are there intuitive ways to combine A ∈ N (X) with A′ ∈ N (X ′) to A × A′ ∈ N (X ×X ′),
etc.?
Given N (X), we can compare x, x′ ∈ X :
Definition 6.6.1
Define U(x) := {A ∈ N (X) : x ∈ A}, and S(x) :=
⋂
U(x).
Let x ≺ x′ iff S(x) ⊆ S(x′) (alternatively: card(S(x)) < card(S(x′)))
This generalizes the comparison in preferential relations, minimal elements are not comparable
among each other.
Remark 6.6.1
(1) This is a special case of a preferential relation, as minimal elements stay minimal, it is about
subideal elements.
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(2) It is robust under weakenings like in {N(φ), N(φ ∨ ψ)}.
(3) What are the properties of the resulting relation, coherence conditions?
(4) Can we find a complete set of such properties (representation)?
(5) Transitivity of defaults is treated correctly: for (φ : ψ), (ψ : ρ), the best φ-models satisfy ψ,
and the best ψ-models satisfy ρ, so the overall best φ-models satisfy ρ. This is not surprising, as we
pushed defaults into the order, where we work with the best possible elements, as in preferential
structures.
Remark 6.6.2
A remark on reasoning dynamics:
The full system P has no dynamics, because of Cumulativity. In the lottery paradox, once we
concluded that n will now win, n′ has become more likely to win. But, it could also be otherwise.
If we conclude that a bird will probably fly, the flying birds might even be more likely to have
feathers than the not flying ones. Thus, drawing conclusions might also make further conclusions
more secure. In inheritance, upward chaining adds new conclusions, but they become less certain,
as longer paths of reasoning offer more possibilities of attack.
There does not seem to exist a fully general theory of the dynamics of reasoning - but this might
also be too general a problem.
6.7 From propositional to first order logic
In propositional logic, every (complete) possibility exists exactly once. In 1st order logic, a predicate
p(.) may have 0, 1, many elements, likewise combinations of predicates, like p(.) ∧ ¬q(.). The
combinations of properties correspond to propositional models. Here, we treat these combinations,
as if they were classical models. Then, we put as many elements into the “good” combinations,
and compare all models as in the propositional case. Thus, we try to put as many penguins as
possible into the non-flying set, and the others into the flying set. So, given a fixed universe U, we
prefer those structures where more elements are “good”.
(1) More precisely, as in the propositional case, all cases are possible, like b(x)∧f(x), b(x)∧¬f(x),
etc., but they need not have the same cardinality. E.g., b(x) ∧¬f(x) might have 3 elements,
b(x) ∧ f(x) 1 element, or, vice versa. We prefer the latter, as the “better” case b(x) ∧ f(x)
has more elements than the “less good” case b(x) ∧ ¬f(x).
Again, this is still up to interpretation for the right preference relation. This preference
relation should certainly satisfy: If, in structure S, every x in the universe satisfies a default
set Xx which is at least as good as the default set X
′
x satisfied in structure S
′, then S should
be preferred to S′. More complicated relations may be considered, e.g., taking into account
cardinalities, like: More x in S satisfy “good” default sets than in S′, etc., see Section 6.8
(page 74).
(2) Suppose we have birds, penguins, sparrows. Penguins cannot be flying birds, but sparrows
should be. Sparrows are not penguins, so, flying sparrows are better than not-flying sparrows.
Flying sparrows satisfy both defaults (not being penguins, see Section 6.8 (page 74)), but
not-flying sparrows violate the “fly” default, and satisfy the (penguin : ¬fly) default, so they
are worse. We choose sparrows so that they fall into the normal birds set, or, more precisely,
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among the most normal birds. Names should be treated as unary predicates, interpreted by
as normal as possible elements.
6.8 Validity of defaults and the best models
Consider the propositional case, and a non-nested default (φ : ψ), i.e., φ and ψ are classical
formulas. We treat the default similarly to the classical implication φ → ψ, and define for a
classical model m :
m |= (φ : ψ) iff m |= ¬φ or m |= φ ∧ ψ.
We refine this. In classical logic, validity is absolute, 0 or 1. We differentiate the strength of
validity for defaults:
m |= (φ : ψ) holds with strength 1 (the strength of m |= ¬φ) if m |= ¬φ.
m |= (φ : ψ) holds with strength M(φ) if m |= φ ∧ ψ.
m |= (φ : ψ) fails with strength M(φ) if m |= φ ∧ ¬ψ.
The strength M(φ) takes care of specificity - the smaller M(φ), the bigger the strength, this gives
a partial order on strength.
For a full picture, we have to extend this definition to nested defaults.
Example 6.8.1
Consider birds, penguin, ravens. Birds (including ravens) fly, penguins don’t, penguins are birds,
etc. A penguin Tweety which does not fly, fails (bird : fly) with strength “bird”, and satisfies
(penguin : ¬fly) with strength “penguin”. A penguin Tweety’ which flies, satisfies (bird : fly)
with strength “bird”, and fails (penguin : ¬fly) with strength “penguin”. Tweety is a better
model of the whole theory than Tweety’ is, as Tweety fails for less strong defaults than Tweety’
does. Blacky, the flying raven, satisfies (birds : fly) with strength “bird”, and (penguin : ¬fly)
with strength 1, as it is no penguin. Thus, Blacky is the best model of the theory (among Tweety,
Tweety’, Blacky).
We turn to the treatment of contradictions, this can be done in several ways, defining a partial
relation between models. We outline requirements and possibilities, considering a theory T with
classical information φ, . . . and default information (φ : ψ), . . .
(1) Models which contradict classical information φ are the worst.
(2) Models which contradict neither classical nor default information are the best.
(3) Fix a classical model m. Let S(m) be the (multi-) set of strengths of defaults which m fails.
E.g., if m |= φ ∧ φ′, m |= ¬ψ ∧ ¬ρ ∧ ¬ψ′, and T consists of the defaults (φ : ψ), (φ : ρ),
(φ′ : ψ′), then S(m) = {M(φ),M(φ),M(φ′)}. (We suppose that 6|= ψ ↔ ρ - this has to be
refined to account for ψ, ρ which are not independent.)
(4) A comparison of m and m′ will be via a comparison of S(m) with S(m′).
There are many possibilities:
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(4.1) We can treat S(m) as a set, and forget multiple occurrences of the same strength. This is
probably unsatisfactory, as we will treat a model which fails one default the same way as
a model which fails many defaults - as long as they have the same strength. It results in
usual preferential structures, which are unable to treat subideal cases. m |= φ ∧ ψ ∧ ¬ρ
will be then considered equivalent to m′ |= φ ∧ ¬ψ ∧ ¬ρ (when we consider just the
defaults (φ : ψ), (φ : ρ)).
(4.2) We can consider
⋂
S(m), and if
⋂
S(m) ⊂
⋂
S(m′), conclude that m fails in a worse
way than m′ does.
(4.3) We can combine (4.2) with a multiset approach, and “count” only if (4.2) will not decide
between m and m′.
(4.4) We can use any other reasonable way to order a set of partially ordered multisets.
The following questions arise:
(4.1) These are special preferential relations, do additional properties hold?
(4.2) Is there an abstract description, characterization, of such relations?
(5) The first order case:
We use above partial order between propositional models to treat (open) FOL defaults. A
propositional model corresponds to a subset of the universe, like X := {x : p(x) ∧ ¬q(x)}. If
two such subsets X,X ′ of the universe are comparable by above order, we prefer the model
which has more elements in the preferred X - all other things being equal.
This is then a straightforward extension of the propositional case, and handled in the same
spirit.
Example 6.8.2
(1) Consider the default set (p : q), (p : ¬q).
Any ¬p-model satisfies both defaults, any p-model one, but not the other. So the globally
best models are the ¬p-models, the best models of T = {p, (p : q), (p : ¬q)} are all p-models.
(2) This also gives an answer to the inconsistent default (p : ¬p) : The globally best models are
the ¬p-models, the best models for p are all p-models, being all equally bad.
(3) Consider the default set (: p), (: q), (: r), and the background theory (p∧q∧¬r)∨(r∧¬p∧¬q).
Then the model p∧ q ∧¬r satisfies 2 defaults, the model r∧¬p∧¬q only one. We decide by
cardinality, so the former model is better.
(We need here that the defaults are “decomposed”, e.g., not (: p ∧ q) instead of (: p), (: q).
A finer treatment might be needed to cover cases like (: p ∧ q).)
(4) We treat the Nixon diamond similarly. (p : r), (q : ¬r). Consider T := {p∧q, (p : r), (q : ¬r)},
the two models p ∧ q ∧ r and p ∧ q ∧ ¬r are equally good (or bad), so none is preferred - we
are directly sceptical, we have no result about r.
(5) We use specificity. For (b : f), (p : ¬f), p→ b, we have the globally best models: ¬b-models
and b ∧ ¬p ∧ f -models (they satisfy both defaults), among the p-models, (by p→ b, b holds)
all fail one default, and the ¬f -models are better by specificity.
(6) Consider (: φ), (: φ ∨ ψ). The best models are those which satisfy φ, the second best satisfy
φ ∨ ψ but not φ, the worst satisfy neither.
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6.8.1 Asymmetric OR
We have treated (φ : ψ) above similarly to the classical implication φ → ψ. It is natural to try
and extend this, by translating “somehow” (φ : ψ) to φ→ (¬normal(φ) ∨ ψ). But this is then an
asymmetric “OR”, as in most cases, normality and ψ will hold. In particular, we will prefer to try
and make normality hold, e.g., in a mechanical proof system.
We may extend this idea to asymmetric theory revision, where K ∗ (φ ∨ ψ) is preferably achieved
by making φ true.
6.9 Inheritance
Remark 6.9.1
Inheritance diagrams allow to treat subideal cases, but only with information of differing strength;
penguins still inherit “feathers” from birds, although they cannot fly. Preclusion might override
weaker information. But we have an unrestricted AND for information of same maximal strength
(the “Garbage In” rule). So we cannot treat the Lottery Paradox.
6.9.1 Direct scepticism vs. intersection of extensions
We have to distinguish whether inheritance systems are to speak about the state of the world,
or about our knowledge of the world. We may not know whether Nixon was a pacifist or not
(direct scepticism), but he was one of the two, so one of the extensions represents reality (leading
to the intersection of extensions approach). Thus, the distinction between state of the world
and knowledge, and between elements and sets, provides an answer to the direct scepticism vs.
intersection of extensions question.
In addition, if “Nixon” were a set, and not one element, there is even a third possibility: (almost)
all Nixons are pacifists, (almost) all Nixons are not pacifists, and there is no majority for either.
(In knowledge terms, we may know the latter holds, the latter or the first holds, etc., )
Remark 6.9.2
The existence of copies in classical preferential structures may code our ignorance - we do not know
which x is smaller than x′, we only know that it is one of the x ∈ X. We have all possibilities
in one structure, this expresses scepticism. Alternatively, we may work with many structures in
parallel, see [SGMRT00], this corresponds to an extensions approach.
6.9.2 The language of inheritance
(1) The (implicit) language of inheritance is not sets and arrows, but the atoms are arrows, and
the results are valid paths. Only in a latter step, valid paths are transformed into (soft)
arrows. When p → q is an arrow in the diagram, neither q → p nor q 6→ p need be in the
language. Thus, a comparison (soundness and completeness) with the reasoning with small
sets etc. must only be about the information which can be expressed in the language of the
diagram. Here, q 6→ p may well be a result of reasoning with corresponding small sets, but
we cannot compare it, as it is not in the language.
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(2) We see this (the language) also by the fact that we may have several paths resulting in the
same conclusion, but one might be destroyed by further reasoning, and the other not.
(3) We can define the language using admissible paths (concatenations of arrows pointing in the
same directions, with at most one negative arrow, at the end), and/or their conclusions.
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